OP-ED COLUMNIST
A Vision of Power
By PAUL KRUGMAN

here's
a deep mystery surrounding Dick Cheney's energy task force, but it's
not about what happened back in 2001. Clearly, energy industry
executives dictated the content of a report that served their interests.
The real mystery is why the Bush administration has engaged in a
three-year fight — which reaches the Supreme Court today — to hide the
details of a story whose broad outline we already know.
One possibility is that there is some kind of incriminating evidence in
the task force's records. Another is that the administration fears that
full disclosure will highlight its chummy relationship with the energy
industry. But there's a third possibility: that the administration is
really taking a stand on principle. And that's what scares me.
Could there be a smoking gun in the records? Well, maybe Mr. Cheney was
already divvying up Iraq's oil fields in 2001, but I'd be surprised to
find anything that clear-cut. It's more likely that the administration
fears that releasing the task force's records would alert the public to
the obvious.
Those of us who have been following such things know that the Bush
administration is so deeply enmeshed in the energy industry that it's
hard to know where one ends and the other begins. Campaign
contributions are part of it, but it's also personal: George
Bush and Dick Cheney are only two of the many members of the
administration who grew rich by relying on the kindness of energy
companies. Indeed, the day after the executive director of Mr. Cheney's
task force left the government, he went into business as an energy
industry lobbyist.
In return, the Bush administration has given energy companies a lot to
celebrate. One policy decision alone, effectively scrapping "new source
review" in regulating power plant pollution, is worth billions of
dollars to industry donors.
But if we know all this, why does the release of the task force's
records matter? The answer, I think, is that there's a big difference
between compelling circumstantial evidence and a more or less official
confirmation.
Consider, as a parallel, the case of the nonexistent W.M.D. It was
pretty clear by last summer that Saddam didn't have the weapons that
were the ostensible reason for war. But it wasn't until January, when
David Kay admitted that there was nothing there, that the absence of
W.M.D. got traction with the broad public.
The main public justification for the Cheney task force was the
2000-2001 electricity crisis in California. For at least two years,
we've known that this crisis was largely the result of market
manipulation by energy companies — and surmised that some of those same
companies were advising Mr. Cheney on energy policy. But the public
will pay a lot more attention if it turns out there is documentation
that any energy executives were telling Mr. Cheney how to solve power
shortages even as their traders were busily creating those shortages.
Still, Mr. Cheney's determination to keep his secrets probably reflects
more than an effort to avoid bad publicity. It's also a matter of
principle, based on the administration's deep belief that it has the
right to act as it pleases, and that the public has no right to know
what it's doing.
As Linda Greenhouse recently pointed out in The New York Times, the
legal arguments the administration is making for the secrecy of the
energy task force are "strikingly similar" to those it makes for its
right to detain, without trial, anyone it deems an enemy combatant. In
both cases, as Ms. Greenhouse puts it, the administration has put
forward "a vision of presidential power . . . as far-reaching as any
the court has seen."
That same vision is apparent in many other actions. Just to mention
one: we learn from Bob Woodward that the administration diverted funds
earmarked for Afghanistan to preparations for an invasion of Iraq
without asking or even notifying Congress.
What Mr. Cheney is defending, in other words, is a doctrine that makes
the United States a sort of elected dictatorship: a system in which the
president, once in office, can do whatever he likes, and isn't obliged
to consult or inform either Congress or the public.
Not long ago I would have thought it inconceivable that the Supreme
Court would endorse that doctrine. But I would also have thought it
inconceivable that a president would propound such a vision in the
first place.
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