Hilzoy, who’s guest blogging in place of Kevin Drum for a few days, has a good post today that tries to explain to Republicans why they should oppose President Bush’s violation of the separation of powers. It’s a good post; I don’t delude myself into thinking that it will convince the unconvinceable, but it’s worthwhile reading. It’s got a lot of good citations to the Federalist Papers and suchlike.
I’m reminded of a couple things. First, during now-Justice Roberts’ Senate confirmation hearings, he was asked why he backed certain Reagan Administration policies that he now opposes. He replied, quite fairly, that when he’s working for any client, he’s going to give them as zealous a defense as he possibly can; that’s what lawyers do. If he had been working for the Congress, he said, he would have argued against the Reagan Administration’s case and for Congressional prerogatives. This is slightly disingenuous, because presumably he chose to work for those with whom he agreed. So the question is why he chose to go to work for the Reagan Administration, and defend their policies, if he didn’t agree with them. The White House is no ordinary law firm; presumably people choose to work there only if they agree with the Administration’s policies. I don’t see many Clinton staffpeople working for Bush.
But he does raise a very valid point, which gets at the heart of the separation of powers. The separation of powers is fundamentally a realization that everyone within the three branches is working at cross purposes. If the Executive Branch had its way, it would have all the power all the time; likewise for the legislature. The process has to be set up in such a way that every power from one branch cancels out another power from one of the others.
At the same time, there’s something spectacularly weird about this structure. It allows people to defend positions that they know to be unethical or flawed, just because their client demands it. See, for instance, the Administration’s insistence that its powers in the War on Terror are virtually limitless. They are expected to make claims like this, which every legal scholar whom I respect has denounced. In fact nearly everyone I’ve read has said that the Administration would be laughed out of court with these claims.
Now, if a lawyer were to advise his client to do something that the lawyer knew was indefensible, wouldn’t the lawyer suffer for it? If the lawyer’s advice were egregious enough, wouldn’t he be disbarred?
So what institutional checks are there on lawyers for the Executive Branch? Are they still subject to disbarment? And how egregious must their violations be before they suffer for it?
But disbarment alone doesn’t seem like an effective check. We need something built into the separation of powers itself, such that the executive branch and the legislature feel less inclined to take giant legal leaps (e.g., the torture memos). As it stands, it seems that the only check against them is fairly weak: the Executive Branch enacts a policy based on faulty legal reasoning, and some years down the line — after many have been tortured and many others jailed without trial — the Supreme Court strikes down that policy. That hardly seems like an effective check.
The Federalist Papers spend a long time arguing against their opponents’ claim that the Constitution creates a kingdom by another name. At least at present, it strikes me that the anti-Federalists were right. At the very least, the Federalists downplayed the likelihood that strong political parties would arise; they viewed “factions” as a great danger in a democracy. Factions seem to be precisely the problem today: the Executive Branch and legislature don’t check one another; rather, Democrats and Republicans do. When all three branches are dominated by one party, we can’t expect the Constitution’s idea of checks and balances to work properly.
One change that would do a world of good is a modification in Senate rules. These rules get no coverage in the Constitution — or rather, the Constitution explicitly leaves those rules up to the houses themselves:
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
At present, the majority party gets to decide committee chairmanships. As we saw when Delay was Majority Leader, the majority party uses this to silence the minority party. A simple change to the rules, whereby chairmanships belong to the most senior member, would do a world of good. It would probably create its own difficulties, but it would at least reduce the tyranny of the majority within the legislature. I’m sure there’s a list of other rules that benefit the majority.
Of course, trying to change these rules will be difficult: the majority never wants to cede its power to the minority. I imagine that if Democrats retake Congress, they will want to make up for years of abuse by exacting the same abuse on Republicans. The only way to avoid this is for Democrats to realize that some day they will once again be the minority party; when that happens, chairmanships based on seniority will benefit them. This is the same reason why intelligent Republicans should vote against the “nuclear option” of forbidding judicial filibusters: one day, they will be the minority, and that filibuster will serve them just as much as it serves Democrats today. Of course, I’m convinced that Republicans are trying to make themselves the majority-party-for-life, and if they’re successful they have every reason to vote against the filibuster.
The Constitution is not sacrosanct: if we need to modify it to weaken one branch and strengthen another, that’s exactly what we should do. If we need to leave Congressional rules up to a vote of the people, we should do that.