Quick note on Richard Hofstadter’s The Age Of Reform: it has much of the studied breeziness of Hofstadter’s later Anti-Intellectualism In American Life, but feels less complete. The breeziness in the latter is undergirded by immense research and restraint; if you spoke with Hofstadter about Anti-Intellectualism, he’d probably pour forth with a torrent of evidence that never made it into the book despite its merit. The Age Of Reform is less disciplined, less erudite, and advances less evidence, hence is less convincing. It’s certainly important as a guide to understanding the era of progressive and populist politics between the Bryan era and F.D.R., and it helps me to grasp the intricacies of an era about which I knew little. But it ultimately feels as though it has less staying power than Anti-Intellectualism. There’s probably a better book out there covering the details of the progressive era.
Note also that the later book (Anti-Intellectualism) seems to have picked up a branch or two from this one. Hofstadter only got deeper, it appears, into the pathologies of the American political process as his career advanced; it wouldn’t surprise me if his later work subsumed everything that preceded it.
(To read: “Richard Hofstadter’s the Age of Reform: A Reconsideration”, which I’ve cached.)
P.S.: Having now read “A Reconsideration,” I don’t have especially much to add, except that possibly Hofstadter’s view of American history is quite cynical — which anyone reading either Anti-Intellectualism or Age of Reform has to assume — and that writers coming after him don’t quite agree with his assumptions about the progressive era. Hofstadter fundamentally views much of American history through a dark lens of provincialism, whose roots he traced quite thoroughly, provocatively and convincingly in Anti-Intellectualism; he sees the McCarthy era as a logical endpoint of much that is central to the American mind. It’s an argument that I don’t see much to contest, though I’m also unfamiliar with the historical literature.
If Hofstadter is the pathbreaking, legendary historian that everyone seems to say he is, it must rest in no small part on the effortless grace of his writing. See, e.g., the quote with which Brinkley closes his “Reconsideration”:
When one considers American history as a whole, it is hard to think of any very long period in which it could be said that the country has been consistently well governed. And yet its political system is, on the whole, a resilient and well-seasoned one, and on the strength of its history one must assume that it can summon enough talent and good will to cope with its afflictions. To cope with them — but not, I think, to master them in any thoroughly decisive or admirable fashion. The nation seems to slouch onward into its uncertain future like some huge inarticulate beast, too much attainted by wounds and ailments to be robust, but too strong and resourceful to succumb.
One has to wonder, taking Hofstadter’s synopsis at face value, whether any nation of the U.S.’s size or heterogeneity has managed to “master” its “afflictions.” Did Rome pull it off? How about Britain when it still had colonies? The sort of afflictions Hofstadter has in mind may include our capacity to live up to the creed of the Declaration of Independence, for instance, in which case I wonder whether there are many nations that have even sought the same ends. But if you narrow the scope of the inquiry that far, you’ll almost always have just one nation to look at.
A few contributors to Why The North Won The Civil War made the point that our rather romantic view of American history is in large part just historical accident. It’s an American instinct, perhaps, to view our history — and thereby all history — as one slow and halting upward movement through increasing liberalism. From this perspective, the Civil War could only have ended the way it did, with the end of slavery and the defeat of the Confederacy. It had to end that way, because slavery was a moral wrong, and moral wrong will always lose in the great American story.
Had the Confederacy won — had it either held off the Union advance or gone even further and (this is hard to imagine, because it probably was never in the Confederacy’s plans) captured the great cities of the North — we would be singing a different song. It’s hard to say what that song would be, but in any case: it wasn’t always inevitable that the nation would turn out the way it did. Nor was Lincoln always the rustic god that he’s since become.
The challenge for me is to try to read American history through something other than the rosy light of hindsight. At many crucial points, the upward movement that we perceive today could very well have been a downward slide. For that matter, the upward movement may actually be a downward slide when read through the eyes of those who lost.