Attention conservation notice: 1600 words on a really powerful book about the fatal allure of expert planning. “Don’t underestimate the contributions of your fellow-men” might be the big takeaway.
This book is probably best summarized as follows: The most successful systems are those that exploit the knowledge of all their people, rather than assuming that
society can be changed from the top. All the knowledge of how the world actually works, and the actual complexity of getting things done, resides in the people who need to do it, rather than in the minds of planners far from the action. Beware of those who believe that the people’s indigenous ways are backwards, pre-scientific and ignorant; in reality, though the people’s methods may not have all the rigor of the latest scientific theories, they are likely to be precisely adapted to all the complexity of the world around them.
But Seeing Like A State is much more than that. It is a thoroughly documented attack on high-modernist thinking. This is the mindset of a
Le Corbusier, who comes in for a thorough lashing at Scott’s hands. Le Corbusier and his disciples decided that modern cities were all wrong: their “chaotic” layout must indicate that they were corrupt and unworkable within.
Jane Jacobs most famously tore into that fundamental confusion in The Death and Life of Great American Cities : surface chaos actually conceals remarkable underlying purpose and form. Scott takes a lot from Jacobs. Along with the classical anarchists, she seems to be his biggest inspiration.
The high-modernist ideal is at its worst when it’s combined with infinite state power. Combine these two and you get the evils of the former Soviet Union: shift peasants off their plots into “modern” industrial agriculture and force them to adhere to the latest theories of geometric crop planting — theories like monoculture, identically spaced crops … all very geometrical and orderly in the mind of someone who’s not imaginative enough to see past the surface. And this mindset assumes throughout that the people must just be
ignorant: they mustn’t want to live in crowded cities; they mustn’t know what they’re doing when they farm their polycultured, “chaotic” crops. When combined with state power, the expert is the designated local god. That way lies ruin.
In a lot of respects, this is not an argument against experts, though it could be misconstrued that way. For one thing, scientific experts really do have a lot to contribute to, say, peasant agronomy, and they really can contribute a lot to improving (say) rural sanitation. The trouble is when a few threads come together:
- Ignorance of local conditions.
- Confusing the thing being modeled with the model itself.
- The desire to make the world look like the laboratory
- The power to turn items 1 through 3 into reality.
Item 4 is what makes Seeing Like A State into an argument for anarchism. States get most of Scott’s ire, because they do bequeath this power onto
dictators. But industry comes in for a spanking, too. In fact chapter 8 of Seeing Like A State is the next logical thing to read after
The Omnivore's Dilemma: it explores at a slightly different
level the problems with scientific farming as it’s practiced in the United States. Rather than adapt farming to local conditions, American agriculture bends the
natural world to its particular model of how farming should be done. This includes monoculture, whose predictable consequence is the rise of pests that
are adapted to eat that monocultured crop. The next step in the game, if you’re an American agricultural conglomerate, is to spray loads of pesticides on your
fields. Evolution can play the game too, though, so it responds by building pests who are better adapted to those pesticides. And so the arms race continues.
And so the soil erodes, the pesticide runoff blackens, and so forth.
The root of that whole war is the assumption that nature should play the game our way, rather than that we should bend to it. In turn, this
monomania is a consequence of straight-ahead economic logic that asks what a profit-maximizing firm (farm) would do, then produces an unambiguous
answer: maximize output. When cost and output are the only variables, the model is very clear. It’s only clear, of course, if you ignore other things,
such as long-term soil degradation. Including these other variables would complicate the model. And, again, if you confuse the model with the thing
being modeled, you come to believe that maximizing output is unambiguously and objectively good, rather than being the result of a fixed set of
assumptions.
This is a relentlessly powerful and unbelievably sad book: it picks off, one by one, the forces that made the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries look grotesque.
It suffers from some verbosity; like Robert Caro’s biography of Robert Moses, though, it always manages to save itself within a few paragraphs of where your patience starts to wear thin. The sections on Russian collectivization, the Tanzanian
Ujamaa, Le Corbusier, and the creation of
Brasília, in particular, are worth the price of admission on their own. In all these cases, the thing that the experts created was meant — quite consciously — to negate the society around it. Brasília was the
anti-São Paulo, for instance. Only by relocating to an unoccupied spot in Brazil and starting afresh could the experts create the world as “science” told them it was meant to be made. The consequences were predictable: starvation in Tanzania and in Russia, and a city in Brazil that only survives because people color outside the lines.
Rather than go theoretically very deep, Scott insists on painting the details vividly; I assume this was a stylistic choice, in keeping with the theme that
all the intelligence in a system is at the “edge of the network.” Don’t write like someone positioned at the center, I imagine Scott saying to himself; write like you’re
at the edge. And so he does. This is where a lot of his verbosity comes from.
I have only two wishes for this book:
I wish it gave some more criteria by which to judge modern-day schemes organized by experts. As luck would have it, for instance, my roommate pointed me to a video of William McDonough describing his plans for new Chinese cities — McDonough being one of the Cradle to Cradle guys. The Chinese government has asked McDonough to apply cradle-to-cradle principles to city design; it looks like he’s building a number of 400,000-person cities for them. If you watch the video, and you have the “beware experts with unlimited power” principle in mind, you’ll wonder whether McDonough’s work is another Brasília. His model city surely has the geometric perfection and cleverness of a Brasília or an Ujamaa village. Should I be scared of it?
Probably the answer is simple, if we’re listening to Scott. We need to ask McDonough, “Did you consult with residents to ask how they feel about this city? Or did you impose it from on high, using seemingly perfect principles of architecture and resource conservation?” Like all principles, Scott’s are guidelines rather than rules, but it stands to reason that the people who know how to live are the people who’ll be doing the living, not their overlords.
I’d like more examples of successful scientific interventions. Without them, Scott’s book occasionally sounds anti-scientific. Surely it’s not that, but the absence of positive examples makes that a sensible interpretation.
The $100-billion development question is: how do we combine expert scientific research with indigenous experimentation? How can the West bring its science to nations that could really use the help, without being scientific imperialists about it? What could Western science bring back from Africa and Asia? The Western model of industrial agriculture is really broken, or so it seems to a lot of knowledgeable folks; it would be really helpful to get a rigorous scientific understanding of sustainability from people who’ve sustained their agriculture for thousands of years. I would have liked Scott to provide examples of fruitful two-way collaboration.
This book will appeal to a lot of people. It’ll appeal to those who have already taken Jane Jacobs’s messages about cities to heart. For that matter, it’ll remind a lot of people why they love cities. It goes into more depth on Soviet collectivization than many of us will have encountered. And it will make us think twice before we allow experts to reshape communities from on high.
P.S.: There are some connections here, if I felt like digging, to books like Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart and
Toulmin’s Human Understanding. The message of Simple Heuristics is that a lot of rough-and-ready statistical methods might not have the theoretical beauty of, say, linear models, but they’re
more likely to work in a broader set of cases when the data don’t conform to the model quite as well; they’re “ecologically rational,” to use Gigerenzer et al.’s phrase. In a lot of cases, Scott seems to be saying that indigenous agriculture is ecologically rational, whereas Western agriculture needs a lot of idealizing assumptions to make the real world look like the laboratory.