Dean Baker, Plunder and Blunder: The Rise and Fall of the Bubble Economy

There already are many books about the financial collapse of 2008, and there will be many more. Plunder and Blunder, for breadth, brevity, and readability alone, should be one of the few on your shelf if you care to understand how it all happened.
Baker chases down the causes of the boom to a number of places and a number of people: the Clinton White House’s decision to maintain a cheap dollar in the ’90s, Joe Lieberman’s fight to have stock options not count as expenses under FASB rules, and the conflicts of interest — bond-rating agencies getting paid by the companies whose instruments they rated, property-value assessors getting paid by homeowners, auditors paid by the companies they audit, corporate boards existing at the whim of their CEOs — with which we’ve become so familiar in the past few years. His solution to these conflicts of interest is what you’d expect: enforce independence. A bond-rating agency would be chosen at random for a given bond issue, a home-price appraisal would be randomly assigned to a homeowner, and so forth.
Other solutions are maybe more controversial. Baker revisits the idea of a tax on stock-market transactions, proposed in 1989 (at the latest) by no less a personage than Larry Summers as a way to reduce speculation. Sometimes this seems like a good idea, sometimes not.
Plunder and Blunder is worth reading if only for two sections: a two-page sketch of how to identify stock-market bubbles in the future (using price-to-earnings ratios), and another on how to spot home-price bubbles. Home prices, says Baker, had not risen in real terms in one hundred years; the main allures of homeownership come through forced saving and some tax benefits. So any increase in home prices that exceeds inflation is immediately suspect.
Here would have been the place, by the way, for Baker to push for an end to the mortgage-interest deduction, which artificially increases demand for homes, artifically increases demand for larger homes, and benefits the wealthy substantially more than it benefits the poor. Baker didn’t take the bait, and it’s not clear to me why he didn’t.
It’s a quick, meaty read, and is a must-own.
I’ve never heard this argument before but it actually makes a lot of sense when you think about it. Does he back this statement up with numbers?
Comment by Jamie — June 23, 2009 @ 4:57 am
Yeah, he does. I don’t actually own the book (I got it out of the library), so I can’t pull up the numbers right now. If I recall correctly, the guys who made the Case-Shiller Index (their names are Case, and also Shiller) extended their analysis back 100 years, somehow. I’ll dig around. If you want to dig too, I’m basically just going to do some historical Case-Shiller hunting.
Note also that the claim of no net property-value appreciation is a national average. Property values in Boston and the Bay Area have certainly appreciated. Those in Detroit have not.
Comment by slaniel — June 23, 2009 @ 9:22 am
If I recall, the claim is that housing prices did not rise faster than inflation in the 100 years preceding 1995. In the decade following (1996-2006), housing prices rose 70% after adjusting for inflation, leading to an $8 trillion housing bubble.
Comment by Paul — June 23, 2009 @ 10:27 am
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue46/Baker46.pdf
Comment by Paul — June 23, 2009 @ 10:28 am
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