Swapping delete and backspace in Snow Leopard’s Terminal

slaniel | OS X | Sunday, September 27th, 2009

This was driving me nuts: in Snow Leopard’s Terminal, hitting the Delete key deletes the character in front of the cursor. This is at least consistent with the name on the key, but it’s not consistent with the key’s behavior in every other application; everywhere else, that key deletes behind the cursor. So it’s labeled ‘Delete’, but it acts like ‘Backspace’, except in the Terminal.

In earlier versions of OS X, there was an option within the Terminal that said explicitly “swap Delete and Backspace,” or something similar. That very clear name has apparently gone away. To do the swap under Snow Leopard, you need to go to the Terminal menu, then Preferences, then Settings tab, then Advanced, and check “Delete sends Ctrl+H”.

Our long national nightmare is over.

Programming language question: why does dynamism matter?

slaniel | Programming languages | Sunday, September 27th, 2009

This is probably a stupid question, but I’ll ask anyway: why is it important that a programming language be dynamic? There may be confusing terminology, so let me be specific: why shouldn’t I want my language to require that types be specified for all objects at compile time?

I can think of many reasons why we would want static typing, and I’ve not run into many instances where I, myself, have used the ostensibly valuable dynamic features of languages like Python. This probably speaks to my own programming style more than to programming generally. When I declare an int, it remains an int for the duration of the program; I have no problem casting an int to a string if I’m going to perform string operations on it.

But again, there are those who swear by the value of dynamism. So help me out here: what does dynamism buy you? I’ve had lots of people tell me, for instance, that Python made a choice to be dynamic. So why did they do that?

I’m messing around with Objective-C now, and I see that it’s rather more dynamic than its name would suggest. People have told me that iPhone development requires this dynamism. What about iPhone development requires it?

Note, from my earlier questions, that I’m learning C# and Objective-C at the same time (for different purposes). I’m also learning ASP.NET, and will take a crash course in Hadoop before a conference on the subject next weekend. I feel like the stereotypical tourist during his first week in a new place: “Why do they do it like this? It’s not like this at home! I want soup, and all they have are snails.” Etc. I’m trying to avoid being That Guy. So please don’t take any of my questions as “my programming language is better than your programming language” huffiness; I come to all of this in a spirit of asking, rather than declaiming.

Paul Kirk likely to temporarily replace Ted Kennedy

slaniel | Politics and policy | Thursday, September 24th, 2009

…says WBUR.

This is much less exciting to me than naming Dukakis or Atul Gawande to the post. I’m sure Patrick knows what he’s doing here, but … yeah, I haven’t felt this underwhelmed since it turned out that Deep Throat was Mark Felt rather than Kissinger or Mothra or G. Gordon Liddy.

For shame, President Obama

slaniel | Guantánamo; Law; Obama, Barack; Torture | Thursday, September 24th, 2009

The Obama White House will continue indefinitely detaining 50 terrorism suspects at Guantanamo:

The legal interpretation applies to detainees whom the government concludes should be held because they are a continuing danger to national security but who cannot be brought to trial for various reasons, like evidence tainted by harsh interrogations.

There is no simpler way to put it: this is completely fucked. In a regular, old-fashioned trial, if the evidence of your guilt resulted from torture, a jury would presumably find you innocent. This is the “fruit from the poison tree” doctrine: in order to discourage police from coercing confessions, planting evidence and so forth, the law says that certain kinds of evidence taints anything it touches and must be thrown out. This Obama decision turns that on its head: because this evidence is poisoned, we’re going to hold them forever. Completely, utterly fucked.

The stain will not be lifted from our country until we stop this.

Flash player for x86_64 Linux

slaniel | Linux | Tuesday, September 22nd, 2009

Pretty sexy: there’s an alpha version of the Adobe Flash player for 64-bit Intel (“x86_64″) Linux machines. I have found running the 32-bit Flash player under 64-bit Linux to be an exercise in frustration: periodically Firefox will hang, and I’ll have to go kill a process called npviewer.bin to bring it back to life. If I’m not mistaken, npviewer.bin is the compatibility wrapper that allows a 32-bit plugin to work on a 64-bit browser; it doesn’t work well, and I wish it ill. Even a 64-bit alpha plugin is better than a habitually unstable 32-bit plugin.

Once you’ve downloaded it,

  • unzip it with tar xzf libflashplayer-10.0.32.18.linux-x86_64.so.tar.gz (substituting the name of the file you just downloaded).
  • copy the libflashplayer.so file that came out of the archive into any Firefox plugin directories that look appetizing. I copied it into /usr/lib64/firefox-3.0.14/plugins, /usr/lib64/firefox-3.5.2/plugins, and /usr/lib64/firefox-addons/plugins. For completeness, I should note that you’ll need to copy it as root. A command line this should do it all at once:

    for plugin_dir in `find /usr/lib64/firefox* -type d -iname '*plugin*' -not -iname 'searchplugins'`; do
        sudo cp libflashplayer.so $plugin_dir
    done
    

Mike Capuano

slaniel | Politics and policy | Saturday, September 19th, 2009

I see in today’s Talking Points Memo daily roundup that Barney Frank has endorsed Mike Capuano as Ted Kennedy’s replacement. This is very exciting to me: Capuano is my Congressman, living as I do in the 8th Congressional District. I’ve dealt with his office a bunch, particularly during the health-care debate. They’ve gone above and beyond the call of duty; one of his aides has sent me lots of information at various important stages during the bill-making process, knowing that I want to be as involved as I can. Capuano sends out a weekly email update, and he’s uniformly on the liberal side of any issue. Indeed, imploring my representatives to pass liberal legislation often seems silly: my reps are usually on the left for any vote. Capuano himself is a member of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, which was cofounded by Bernie Sanders. (Everybody loves Bernie.)

There are other good candidates to replace Senator Kennedy. A friend is a fan of Martha Coakley, for instance. I’ve not made up my mind yet, but I’m really excited that Capuano’s running. He’s got some big shoes to fill.

Ronald Reagan and the collapse of the Soviet Union

(Attention conservation notice: 1700 words or so, more or less thinking aloud and bringing together some ins, some outs, and some what-have-yous from inside the duder’s head.)

I’m reading White and Wildavsky’s The Deficit and the Public Interest: The Search for Responsible Budgeting in the 1980s, as mentioned earlier. Turns out that, at least up to page 200 or so, it’s a paean to and a requiem for budget director David Stockman — the ideological standard-bearer of the Reagan Revolution, who gradually gained an education in how actual politics works. He seems like a quite tragic figure: the guy who’s trying to do right by his convictions, thinks that he can honor those convictions in public life, and eventually realizes that this is impossible. I’ve been interested in reading Stockman’s The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed ever since it played a starring role in The Politics Presidents Make. Like many books that are more than 10 years old, Stockman’s is available used for a penny on Amazon.

If you’re not up for reading a whole book on Stockman, you might enjoy William Greider’s article “The Education of David Stockman”, which came out in the middle of the Reagan budget debacle and brought a shitstorm down on Stockman. This is the article in which William Greider famously quoted Stockman as saying that “None of us really understands what’s going on with all these numbers,” thereby convincing Reagan’s Democratic opposition that they needn’t trust a word out of the White House on how the budget would work. In penance, Stockman was forced to grovel and genuflect publicly; James Baker instructed Stockman, according to White and Wildavsky,

“You’re going to have lunch with the President. The menu is humble pie. You’re going to eat every last mother-f’ing spoonful of it. You’re going to be the most contrite sonofabitch the world has ever seen.” In a lengthy press conference after lunch, Stockman proclaimed his loyalty and described the lunch as “a visit to the woodshed after supper.”

So The Deficit and the Public Interest turns out, so far anyway, to be more about legislative and executive sausage-making (and Bismarck was right: I think I’d prefer not to know how my sausage is made) than about the intricacies of Senate procedure. I’m sure it’ll land on procedure soon enough, when we get to Gramm-Rudman. In the meantime, it’s quite sadomasochistically enjoyable — like removing a Band-Aid from the suppurating wound of my idealism.

As I read it, I realize how little I knew about the actual Reagan Revolution. I picked up some details in The Politics Presidents Make, whose overarching idea is that real revolutions get harder and harder to make as constituencies calcify around the results of earlier revolutions. What I didn’t understand was the intensity of the disconnect between Reagan’s principles and his policies, or the sheer ignorance that led him to believe that one could simultaneously cut taxes, vastly increase defense spending, and eliminate the deficit.

So now I’m thinking back on the common story about Reagan and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The story goes like this: Reagan knew that the Soviets were spending unsustainably on defense. Because they had to spend so much of their GDP on weapons that they couldn’t afford, they couldn’t afford to buy their people any consumer goods. As the Russian people got wind of how much fun we in the West were having, they revolted. Hence the end of the dictatorship. White and Wildavsky provide some evidence that Reagan did, indeed, think this way: they quote Elizabeth Drew, retelling her interview with Reagan “in early 1980″:

Reagan replies [italics in White and Wildavsky]: “I think the Soviet Union is probably at the very limit of its military output. It has already had to keep its people from having so many consumer goods. Instead, they’re devoting it all to this military buildup. I think it’s the greatest military buildup the world has ever seen. … what I think the Russians would fear more than anything else is a United States that all of a sudden would hitch up our belt and say, ‘OK, Buster, we’ve tried this other way [of reducing military expenditures]. We are now going to build what is necessary to surpass you.’ And this is the last thing they want from us, an arms race, because they are already running as fast as they can and we haven’t started running.”

(The Drew article is behind the New Yorker paywall; I’ve cached a copy. Warning: owing to the New Yorker’s really odd and seemingly ill-advised archiving system, the cached copy is a 60+-megabyte PDF.)

I wonder about the mechanism that Reagan imagined here. Had they wanted to, the Soviets could have spent on defense entirely out of debt. This is unsustainable in the long-term, probably: too much debt, and eventually inflation shoots through the roof. (I’m not going to enter into the macroeconomics, which in any case I don’t understand.) But in the short term, some debt is fine. If Reagan thought that the Soviets couldn’t sustain the debt load that they had taken on to fund the arms race, this would only seem plausible if their debt as a fraction of GDP was really exorbitant. That is, the “let’s jack up their debt until they die” approach would only work if Reagan expected that hyperinflation was just around the corner. A bit of googling doesn’t turn up any numbers on Soviety debt-to-GDP ratios, though it sounds like Soviet accounting was dodgy, to say the least.

Relatedly: a Communist, centrally planned economy is a different kind of beast from a capitalist one, but doesn’t debt have to come from the same avenues? That is, if a Communist government spends more than it takes in — and I suspect that what “it takes in” is a difficult concept when the government controls the means of production — doesn’t it need to issue debt, some of which will go to foreign creditors? So then, no matter what budget numbers the Soviets reported to the world, couldn’t the world tally up Soviet debts and get a more accurate picture?

Clearly I need to learn a lot more before I can answer this.

There’s also a military logic that I don’t entirely grasp. It’s common knowledge that the Soviets and the Americans had enough nuclear weapons on hand to more than destroy each other in the event of a war. What’s the logic of an arms race once you’ve reached that point? What does it buy you to spend 5x on defense, when x is already sufficient to completely destroy your enemy? Isn’t there a point where the arms race would just stop?

Obviously the amount that the Soviets can afford to spend on consumer goods is a product both of Soviet revenues and of Soviet expenditures. The “Reagan toppled Communism” story only focuses on the latter. I always thought there was a tidiness on the other side, which comes out in Ken Deffeyes’s Beyond Oil: The View From Hubbert's Peak:

Stephen Kotin points out that the Soviet Union, up to 1985, was exporting two million barrels of oil per day. The hard currency from oil allowed the Soviets to import items that were internally in short supply, from electronics to soap. At that time, Soviet oil production was larger than Saudi production by a factor of three, but Saudi Aramco had much lower production costs. Saudi Aramco resorted to a familiar tactic: a price war. They flooded the world with oil and drove the world price of crude oil below the Soviet cost of production and transportation. The severe shortages of everything that developed within the Soviet bloc are illustrated by this story:

A Polish businessman is going on a trip to Moscow and his wife asks him to bring back notes about the shortages in Russia. He goes into a butcher shop, and there are only a few little scraps of salt pork, so he writes in his notebook: NO MEAT. He then goes into a greengrocer and writes NO VEGETABLES. A shoe store: NO SHOES. After several more shops, a man stops him on the street and asks, “Are you spying for the CIA?” The businessman explains that his wife asked him to take notes. “Don’t you know that ten years ago you would have been shot for doing this?” He writes: NO BULLETS.

After six years without hard currency, the Soviet Union collapsed.

(internal footnote omitted)

I don’t know to what extent to buy this story, either. If you look at historical real crude oil prices, they only really spiked in the early 70s, and have stayed above their historical average ever since. So in real terms, a barrel of crude was still buying the Soviets more in the mid-80s than it did in Stalin’s time. If you’re going to use the drop in crude prices to explain the collapse in the Soviet economy, you have to explain why it didn’t collapse 40 years earlier. And in any case, a lot will depend upon how important those 2 million barrels were to the overall Soviet economy. Where else did their GDP come from?

As Krugman wrote in Pop Internationalism, the Soviet economy grew at a rapid clip in the middle of the 20th century in large part because of a phenomenal savings rate: the government shoved all savings into building out the country’s infrastructure. Krugman:

Economic growth that is based on expansion of inputs, rather than on growth in output per unit of input, is inevitably subject to diminishing returns. It was simply not possible for the Soviet economies to sustain the rates of growth of labor force participation, average education levels, and above all the physical capital stock that had prevailed in previous years. Communist growth would predictably slow down, perhaps drastically.

So there are at least a few explanations for the Soviet collapse: Reagan pushing their defense spending beyond the breaking point; the Arabs cutting off their main source of revenue; or economic logic finally catching up to the inefficiency of a centrally planned economy. It seems sensible to me not to look for the Soviet collapse in any one of these, but instead to understand how they all worked together. Statisticians here would look for a model that assigns each cause its proper weight. I’ll look around and see if anyone has done this.

My first stupid .NET question

slaniel | .NET | Friday, September 18th, 2009

Today I’ve had occasion to use the .NET NameValueCollection object. In particular, the HTTPRequest.Params object — modeling the name/value pairs of parameters passed in with an HTTP request — stores those pairs as a NameValueCollection.

As a Python person, I’d expect a NameValueCollection to behave like a dictionary. In particular, you should be able to grab a list of tuples (or whatever the .NET equivalent is): a list that looks like

[(key1, val1), (key2, val2), ..., (keyN, valN)]

This is handy in Python (and Perl, for that matter): you can do

for (key, val) in mydict.iteritems():
    print "%s: %s" % (key, val)

rather than the somewhat clunkier

for key in mydict.iterkeys():
    val = mydict[key]
    print "%s: %s" % (key, val)

In Perl it would be

while my ($key, $val) = each(%dict) {
    print "$key: $val\n";
}

There doesn’t seem to be anything in the NameValueCollection object that resembles Python’s iteritems() or Perl’s each. This is surprising to me.

So: how am I misunderstanding what this class does? I assume the mistake is on my side rather than Microsoft’s.

The smartest, simplest reason to support insuring illegal immigrants

slaniel | Health care and insurance; Helping the Less Fortunate | Wednesday, September 16th, 2009

The more you pay attention to this sort of thing, the more you notice that the right wing’s positions don’t even make sense on their own terms. Let me clarify that there are smart conservatives, and that a lot of libertarian ideas appeal to me. (Indeed, I’ll write a blog post soon on the parts of libertarianism I agree with, just so you folks know I’m not all-bleeding-heart-all-the-time.) But the “right wing” is a whole other thing: it’s xenophobia and racism and intolerance that the other half of the Republican party — the pro-business libertarian side — has latched onto for its own anti-liberal purposes. I don’t think most Republican policymakers actually care whether illegal immigrants are insured; the issue just happens to be a convenient anti-Democratic weapon.

In any case, I wanted to point you to a really brilliant and simple post by Ezra Klein on why it makes sense to support insuring illegal immigrants especially if you want to limit illegal immigration. Here’s the perfectly straightforward logic:

  • If you want to make something happen less, make it cost more.
  • If you require employers to insure illegals, you make it more expensive to hire illegals.
  • Contrariwise, if you require employers only to insure Americans, you make Americans cost more to hire than illegals. You therefore make it more attractive to hire illegals than to hire Americans.

So even by their own standards, the xenophobes’ position doesn’t make any sense.

I’m not even mentioning the ethical argument for insuring everyone, of course. But while I’m at it: suppose an illegal alien comes down with an infection — think even of something like conjunctivitis — but because he’s uninsured, he doesn’t go to the doctor. He’s now out and about in the world spreading his infection rather than getting it treated. He’s then spreading it to you and your friends and your children, because we’ve chosen not to insure him. Put another way: diseases don’t stop spreading based on who’s insured and who’s not. So again, this time from a public-health perspective, the xenophobes’ virulent hatred of illegals is penny-wise and pound-foolish.

One can hope that the right decision will come out of Congress eventually. Last I knew, it wasn’t hopeful. Still: nothing to do but keep fighting.

Getting sound to work under Windows 7 under VirtualBox under Linux

slaniel | Linux; VirtualBox | Monday, September 14th, 2009

This is one of those Super-Obscure Technical Things that needs to be said by exactly one person on the Internet to save others the trouble when they’re googling.

So.

Should you find yourself in the comparatively unlikely situation that you’re

  1. Running Linux (I’m running Ubuntu Jaunty, though I suspect this holds for other up-to-date Linuxes),
  2. Running VirtualBox within Linux,
  3. Running Windows 7 within VirtualBox, and
  4. Would like to be able to play sounds under Windows 7,

then it turns out you’re in luck. The trick is that you need to download a driver for the AC97 soundcard from the not-entirely-English-compliant Realtek website, then install that under Windows and restart the virtual machine. This step probably should have occurred to me sooner, but I always instinctively assume that Windows works flawlessly with all existing drivers; this is presumably not the case yet with Windows 7, which hasn’t officially been released.

So download and install the driver. You may need to disable the AC97 sound device, restart Windows, then shut it down, re-enable the device, and restart it again. Or you may not. Installing the driver is the key.

Now you’ll have working sound out of your virtual machine. This will come in handy if you should, for instance, have to attend an 8 a.m. teleconference on Tuesday, and your only way of using GoToMeeting is through an obscure combination of technologies (see above).

Speaking of which: try to explain to an Apple Store employee that you run “iTunes under XP under VMWare under Linux.” This is a recipe for funtimes — nearly as fun as reading about budgeting. (It’s a darned good book, and those of you who aren’t reading it with me have thereby impoverished your lives.)

Joseph White, Competing Solutions: American Health Care Proposals and International Experience

Possibly the most boring cover of any book ever: yellow 1970s-style text (sans-serif author name and subtitle, oblique serifed title on a green background.

In a better world, everyone would have read this right around 1995, and by 1996 we would have had health insurance that listened to it.

Its first half is an utterly authoritative look at how health systems work in Canada, Germany, Australia, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. In all of them, health insurance is guaranteed as a fundamental right of citizenship. In all of them, doctors are treated as a special, higher-caste class of worker, so in all of them, doctors must be handled with kid gloves. In Australia, for instance, malpractice cases are reviewed by a panel of doctors, which avoids making them feel like malpractice decisions have been imposed upon them by an ignorant jury. Some countries, notably Germany, have heavily regulated “sickness funds” run by corporations or unions, with transfer payments between the sickness funds depending upon their risk profiles (e.g., sickness funds covering mostly young, healthy people end up subsidizing those funds that cover older, sicker people). Others, like Canada, have insurance systems run mostly by the provinces. In none of the countries studied do they use a system like the one we’re talking about in the United States, where people are required to buy insurance and have to pay if they don’t buy it. For one thing, the administrative overhead of such a system is enormous. As White puts it,

Individuals’ incomes and needs for subsidy would change during the year, creating further difficulties … . Such a subsidy program would require a choice between three unpleasant options: having a huge bureaucracy (to process all applications quickly and accurately), a smaller bureaucracy that was thorough but made people wait, or a smaller bureaucracy that was less thorough so as to reduce waits and that therefore made lots of mistakes.

There’s an important distinction in here: people in other countries “do not pay a price for personal insurance; they do not shop; they contribute.” As White puts it, “The international standard finances whole systems, not individuals, in a redistributive manner” (italics his). Funding health care is just another part of taxation, so the administrative overhead is tiny. “[T]he international standard risks little error,” White writes, “is simple to implement, and provides a stable insurance system. Any system of direct subsidies to individuals has none of these features, yet still, if it is to be adequate, requires the same net transfers from people with higher incomes to people with lower incomes.”

This was the part of Competing Solutions that struck me the hardest. The health-insurance conversation, at least since Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama were competing for the Democratic nomination, has been centered around the “mandate”: whether people will be required to buy insurance. Those of us who toss around terms like “adverse selection” have had the policy upper hand: if people aren’t required to carry insurance, only the sickest people will bother to get insurance, and the whole system will unravel. To the extent that the conversation veered off the mandate at all, it was to discuss the politics of the mandate. Literally no one, in any of the reading that I’ve done over the last two years, has discussed the wisdom of structuring a system like this. Which is odd, when you think about it, because the conversation has even more broadly been about cost control rather than universal access; you’d think that restructuring health insurance to look more like Medicare and in the process lower administrative costs would have been at the top of the list. Yet it was literally nowhere to be found. Another example of redefining “left-wing.”

I don’t mean to focus too much on this part of White’s book, which is really only a few pages toward the end. The funding section illustrates a pervasive feature of Competing Solutions, however: White’s absolute, from-the-ground-up, magisterial grasp of health-insurance issues, quite often leading to realizations that wouldn’t otherwise have occurred to me — debate in this country being as radically circumscribed as it is. White’s book is the very best of academia: slowly, patiently, methodically, and fairly covering an issue from every angle, with surprise the natural product of honesty.

White focuses on far more than just insurance; Competing Solutions is a guide to the reform of entire health systems, as practiced in other countries and as it could be practiced here. It addresses issues like how to encourage doctors to work in rural areas (“Wildavsky’s law”: “even Stalin and Beria couldn’t get doctors to move to the countryside”); how to discourage capital over-/under-invesment, for instance in MRI machines; whether the government should pay for medical education; and, of course, the dreaded “rationing.”

If this book were in everyone’s hands, we could all turn to the sections on France whenever someone holds it up as an example of Eurosclerotic creeping socialism, and look at bits like this:

Private insurance has different functions in France and Germany. In Germany it provides special convenience to some persons who are willing to pay higher fees to providers. In France it provides some supplemental benefits and compensates for cost sharing.

What’s that? France has private insurance? Indeed:

just as most Americans on medicare [sic -- White is diligent about not capitalizing the word] purchase medigap policies, over four-fifths of French citizens obtain supplementary coverage. Usually they obtain it from “mutuelles,” which are descendants of the guild funds. Mutuelles pay for both cost sharing and some extra benefits. Hospitals and the private clinics bill a patient’s mutuelle directly for coinsured inpatient care. A few mutuelles run their own clinics, at which the patient need not lay out any cash for ambulatory care. Private insurance provides some of the same coverage. But private insurers do not have clinics; they risk-rate [i.e., charge premiums that vary with how healthy they think the patient is], and the government favors mutuelles with a range of tax policies. Therefore even some insurance company workers have their own mutuelles!

(Internal footnote omitted.) There’s a hell of a lot of information in that paragraph. This book is dense, in a great way. Even the footnotes are charming: in one, which lists six foundational documents beneath the Clinton “managed care” plan, White writes, “[F]or a summary that expresses the beliefs of some remarkably uninformed supporters, see … .” At the end of that note he writes, “In 1994 the group produced a watered-down version that violated much of their original analysis. At best it was a concession as a matter of political realism; at worst, it represented the real interests of the group’s paymasters, large insurance companies.”

That’s where the book is driving, the whole way through: the intellectual incoherence and obvious insufficiency of every mid-90s American health-care plan. Thank god for the Congressional Budget Office, truly: Ira Magaziner and the others tried very hard to produce a bill that “looked like America,” in the sense that it doesn’t resemble what every other country on earth already does. The CBO, quite rightly, replied to each of them that they need evidence before they’ll claim that these bills save real money. As White, in his biting way, puts it:

“How can you say it can’t be done?” a member of the Clinton administration’s working groups on health care reform reports being continually asked by the groups’ director, Ira Magaziner. “It’s never been tried before!” One might reply that if something has never been done before, that is not the strongest evidence that something is possible. But when analyzed piece by piece, the case for managed competition without a global budget does not hold up. Both the competition and the management have been oversold.

The competitors to the Clinton plan, namely the Chafee and Cooper-Grandy bills, were even worse. No one wants to issue a “Medicare-for-All” bill, it would seem, and even after all this reading I still can’t figure out why.

So I can’t recommend highly enough that you read this book. I hope it has as much of an enlightening effect on you as it did on me. It’s the sort of book that I will undoubtedly return to for years, tapping one vein or another of health-system knowledge. Competing Solutions is inexhaustible.

How illegal immigrants would be treated under the House health-insurance bill

slaniel | Health care and insurance; Helping the Less Fortunate | Thursday, September 10th, 2009

For my sins, I periodically visit Michelle Malkin’s blog. (I won’t dignify it with a link; you can google it.) It is a swamp. Somewhere in there, she links to a blog entry purporting to show that “Obamacare” actually will cover illegal immigrants.

Fortunately for us, that piece links to the Congressional Research Service piece — “Treatment of Noncitizens in H.R. 3200″ — on which this claim is based. (And just to trace this back to its utterly trivial beginnings: people seem to care about this because that dude yelled “You lie!” during Obama’s speech last night. The dude’s name will quickly be forgotten. This country’s hatred of poor brown people will not.) I have done you, my belovèd readers, the favor of excerpting below most of the bits from that report which relate to illegal immigrants. The big takeaways:

  1. Illegal aliens are required to carry health insurance. This doesn’t mean they would receive any money.
  2. Aliens — legal or otherwise — would have access to the Exchange, just like everyone else. That is, if they didn’t have insurance from some other source, like an employer health plan or Medicare, they could shop in the Exchange. This still doesn’t mean they would receive any money.
  3. Immigrants can only receive money if they’re here legally. This leaves open the question — which the report doesn’t address — of whether they’ll still be required to pay for insurance even if they can’t afford it. That is, will poor illegals be even more screwed than they already are?
  4. The bill itself doesn’t set eligibility requirements, but leaves that up to a Commissioner. Big whoop. I’ll wait a couple days and let the web tell me how many other bills leave minor (yes, this is minor) implementation details up to a technocrat.
  5. Illegal aliens can still receive emergency Medicaid. I don’t know what the details here are, though I’ll look them up presently. It sounds to me like the idea is: if you go to an emergency room and you need an appendectomy, but you can’t afford it, Medicaid will help you for five years, regardless of your immigration status.

Item 4 is the one that the right, apparently, is incensed about. That must be what they’re incensed about, because there’s nothing else that could rationally upset them here — unless, that is, they’re actually going to raise a stink about emergency Medicaid.

There’s nothing here, folks. This story is classic Malkin material: come up with some nickname for an Obama plan that suggests there’s unexamined sleeze somewhere deep within; dig around for one right-wing blog or another to justify your claim. After clicking down through various links to an actual authoritative source, it turns out that there’s no there there. (Alternatively, invent your own news network whose talking heads you christen as authoritative.)

As I mentioned, the bits about illegal immigrants are included below.

(more…)

‘Triggers’: we’ve been here before; they didn’t work then, either

There’s been a lot of talk recently about a “trigger” option in the health-care debate: if health care gets bad enough, or if the insurance industry doesn’t “clean up its act” somehow, some sort of plan will kick in.

How fortunate, then, that I should stumble across a highly relevant passage in Joseph White’s Competing Solutions: American Health Care Proposals and International Experience. Bottom line: the trigger idea is bogus, and it never works. Below is the excerpt from White’s book — which, I should add, is 14 years old. Triggers are not a new idea.

(The link included below is mine, not White’s.)

In the 1993-94 health care reform debate, incremental proposals involved one further, particularly deceptive, twist: “triggers.” In this approach, the Congress would enact a set of incremental measures and “give them a chance to work.” If they did not work by a certain date — defined as coverage being below some standard or inflation above some standard — then other measures would be taken. Proponents distinguished between “hard triggers,” meaning that the gun would almost definitely go off, and “soft triggers,” meaning there would be more discretion. Yet no trigger could be truly hard: Congress could always choose not to let it be pulled. Under almost any circumstances a minority could do so, for example by filibustering appropriation of funds to implement the measures.

There is no reason to believe that those who oppose comprehensive reform one year would accept pulling the trigger a few years later. Only when a majority of Americans are uninsured will proponents of the status quo stop arguing that most Americans are doing all right, and even then they will claim that real cost control threatens the quality of care. Using failure to “trigger” reform would require that conditions be even worse than they were in 1994 — costs much higher and coverage less widespread. That price for delay is much too high.

Triggers for health care should work no better than they did to “automatically” reduce the deficit, as called for by the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, one of the greater debacles in the history of American legislation. Failure to achieve the goals of deficit reduction changed no one’s mind about how to achieve that goal, or about its desirability. If costs rise even higher, anbd more people need help to afford insurance, will employrs be more willing to pay, or anyone more willing to help their fellow citizens? Of course not. Proposals for triggers are simply a way to allow politicians to avoid admitting that they do not want to control costs and guarantee health care to all Americans. If adopted, a bill with incremental measures and a trigger for more serious action in, say, 2002 would discourage action before then, as opponents of reform argued that Congress had committed itself to waiting until that date before considering the issue again.

Budgeting reading for sexytimes

All the talk recently of passing health reform via reconciliation, and of the corresponding Byrd Rule, has made me want to read more about the arcana of budgeting. This stuff is important, and it’s worthwhile to understand how the gears turn. (I first got turned on to the possibility that Senate procedure is both vital and chronically overlooked when I read Master of the Senate. I strongly encourage everyone to read all of Robert Caro’s books, but at the very least check out MotS and The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York.)

What luck, then, that the book I just finished — Competing Solutions: American Health Care Proposals and International Experience — cites an earlier book by the same author entitled The Deficit and the Public Interest: The Search for Responsible Budgeting in the 1980s which seems to cover all of this territory. Neither the Senate procedure, nor in fact the budget battles themselves, is something I know a thing about, so Joseph White’s book seems like just the place to go.

Fortunately it’s also a penny, used on Amazon, plus $4 for standard shipping. I hereby invite anyone who’s interested to read it along with me. I should be receiving my copy in a few days.

Haruki Murakami, What I Talk About When I Talk About Running

slaniel | What I Talk About When I Talk About Running | Friday, September 4th, 2009

A small icon of a dude running, at the bottom of the cover, and then only text in red and yellow.

What a gem, this book. It’s inspiring, it’s a quick read, and it makes me desperately want to get back on the road running. Plus, it’s an abrubt 90-degree turn away from everything else I’ve read by Murakami. For one thing, it’s a memoir. But it’s such a simple, honest, charming memoir, as well; you can’t help but love Murakami by the time you’re done.

The picture we get of Murakami is of a very mortal human being, talented and intelligent but more diligent and focused than anything else; these the same attributes have allowed him both to write a novel every year or so, and to run at least one marathon in the same interval. I was reminded of Stephen King’s description of how he writes, from the intro to The Stand (revised, uncut, and excessively long edition):

When asked, “How do you write?” I invariably answer, “One word at a time,” and the answer is invariably dismissed. But that is all it is. It sounds too simple to be true, but consider the Great Wall of China, if you will: one stone at a time, man. That’s all. One stone at a time. But I’ve read you can see that motherfucker from space without a telescope.

Or Nora Roberts’s method, as revealed in her New Yorker profile:

At Vesta, she said that she has one key commandment of writing: “Ass in the chair.”

Murakami’s writing and his running, he says, both have this one-stone-at-a-time, ass-in-the-chair method behind them. He runs every day, even on days when he doesn’t want to. He sits his ass in the chair and writes. He keeps at it; eventually, with lots of hard work, a novel appears on the other end, and he finishes a marathon.

The reader — this one, anyway — could be excused for thinking that this humdrum tone is false modesty: that beneath it all, Murakami writes a lot and writes well because he’s brilliant. He wouldn’t deny for a moment that one needs a measure of talent to be a writer, but he says focus and discipline are at least as important.

You might wonder whether Murakami thinks of clever plots for novels while he’s running. Turns out he doesn’t; he just listens to a lot of music and zones out. His zoning-out reached its peak during a 60+-mile ultramarathon in northern Japan. There he felt for 10+ miles that he wouldn’t be able to make it, but he just.kept.pressing.on. Eventually he reached a state where he could no longer feel pain, and where thoughts flowed in one ear and out the other. He reached the finish line after passing many of his fellow marathoners. He has completed one marathon annually for the last 20-some years, ever since his early thirties.

That’s one of the reasons why What I Talk About... struck me so strongly. I got my start running last year, and had gotten up to really enjoyable 45-minute runs, when my flat feet knocked me out of commission and made my left ankle continuously achy. I’ve been itching to get back into running, trying to find a doctor who won’t tell me, “Your feet are too flat; you should never run again.” Murakami’s book is the inspiration I need, both to get back on the road and to write a book I’ve envisioned. One foot in front of the other, ass in the chair.

Finally, not a small part of What I Talk About...’s charm, for me, is that much of it takes place within Cambridge. Apart from indicating that he taught at Harvard and gave some lectures at MIT, it’s not clear why Murakami was here, but he was, in the middle of this decade. He lovingly describes his runs along the Esplanade, often getting passed by comely Harvard undergrads; he has a real appreciation for my beloved city, which can only endear him to me.

What I Talk About When I Talk About Running is a quick read. It’s inspiring and charmingly unassuming, and a perfect little delight.

What the public option is and isn’t

slaniel | Health care and insurance; Helping the Less Fortunate | Friday, September 4th, 2009

I get why the public option has become such a lightning rod for progressives, and in fact I approve of it. Inasmuch as it mobilizes the base — of which I am emphatically a member — I approve of the excitement over the public option. But I think people have the wrong idea about why it’s important.

There are at least two goals that everyone who supports health reform agrees on:

  • Covering everyone.
  • Reducing cost growth.

(If you don’t support health reform, you’re not part of this conversation. But I don’t see how you can be untroubled by the lack of health insurance among so many of your brethren. The rest of this post is not addressed to you.)

The public option doesn’t help toward universal coverage, so far as I can tell. At the very least, it’s not necessary for universal coverage. We can cover everyone by requiring everyone to have insurance (the “individual mandate”) and/or requiring companies to provide insurance for their employees. If companies don’t provide insurance, they have to pay into a fund; this is called pay or play.

If everyone is required to buy insurance, there will be those who can’t afford to do so. These people will need to be subsidized. Which brings up the first point: with or without a public option (because remember, we’ve not stipulated a public option yet), we’ll need to figure out how to pay for the poor.

The public option’s virtue is supposed to be that it drives down costs, for a few reasons:

  • It would be nonprofit.
  • It would be larger, hence have greater bargaining power over providers.
  • It wouldn’t spend money trying to filter out the riskiest patients.

Let’s focus on that third bullet for a moment. Since the public option isn’t trying to reject unhealthy patients, it’s likely to get the least healthy patients dumped on it; private insurers would love to take these patients off its books. If they’re allowed to cherry-pick their patients, the government would get the riskiest patients and its expenses would skyrocket. Which tells us two things:

  • Even with a public plan, we’ll need to focus on the structure of private insurance regulations, so that the government isn’t unfairly disadvantaged.
  • We don’t want the government to fund health care out of deficit spending. If we don’t do private regulation right, we’ll end up with a ballooning budget for the public plan that we’ll have to fund out of debt. Conservatives worry that the government can print money at will, hence that the public plan has an unfair advantage over private insurers. Its funding needs to be structured so that this can’t happen.

In summary, then, at least a few things need to be resolved in order to provide practical universal coverage:

  • A subsidy for those who can’t afford the individual mandate.
  • Regulation of private insurers to avoid unfairly burdening the public plan.
  • A funding source that doesn’t come entirely from debt.

Now, progressives’ interests, if I read them correctly, are focused on the universality piece more than on the budget-control piece. The public plan is mostly unrelated to universality, and is only a small part of budget control. There are a lot of other things we, as liberals, ought to be talking about in this plan; first among those, it seems to me, is how much to subsidize the poor. The public plan is distracting us from all of that.

Like I mentioned before, though, I appreciate that this public-plan debate is actually symbolic of a broader issue. Liberals, such as myself, wish that the Obama administration had started more on the left, with something like Medicare-for-All, and bargained down to a public option. Liberals are insisting on a public plan, and feel betrayed by the Obama administration’s seeming willingness to throw it overboard, because they believe that this is another example of the spineless Democrats caving on their principles.

It may well be that, and it may be a sign that our party is as pusillanimous as ever. I’ve read enough Ezra Klein by now to suspect, though, that this recent skirmish has much more to do with Senate procedure than with the Democrats themselves; see, for instance, Klein’s recent post about how hard it was for Bush to get what he wanted as well. It’s debatable, in any case, and there’s a good argument that filibuster makes a lot of good or bad bills impossible.

So by all means, let’s continue fighting for a public option, particularly given that the other side has no good arguments apart from fear to array against it. But let’s not get distracted, either, from all the other questions that any health-reform plan needs to answer.

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