Sounds like “ObamaCare kills jobs” in the same way that “stopping people from smoking increases health-care costs” — February 4, 2014

Sounds like “ObamaCare kills jobs” in the same way that “stopping people from smoking increases health-care costs”

I.e., this may be another “tyranny of accounting” problem. See Matt Yglesias for an example.

The usual story with how ending smoking could increase health-care costs is that people live longer, so the medical system has to take care of them when they’re older. (Though without looking at the numbers, I don’t know if this is true. It could be that smokers have to go through long, agonizing cancer treatments that end up costing the same.) By this measure, the best thing for the medical system would be if everyone died in infancy.

Likewise, ObamaCare might make it possible for more people to take part-time jobs now that they don’t need a full-time job to secure insurance; and it might allow people to retire earlier without fear of losing their insurance. I rejoiced almost four years ago that this might happen, and now the CBO thinks that it might.

If we think that people dropping out of the workforce because they can is a bad thing, that is equivalent to saying that it’s bad for people to have more choices. Likewise, if we think that it’s bad for people to live longer and cost society more for their health care, I submit that we’re measuring the wrong things.

Dani Rodrik, “Economics: Science, Craft, or Snake Oil?” — February 2, 2014

Dani Rodrik, “Economics: Science, Craft, or Snake Oil?”

This is a great piece, by the author of the exceptional Globalization Paradox (which I read years ago and never reviewed; shame on me). One of the basic themes underlying that book — and, I gather, underlying Rodrik’s One Economics, Many Recipes — is that reality is complicated, and that economics can give you diverse conclusions depending upon your assumptions. Different assumptions are appropriate for different contexts. Free trade doesn’t always, for instance, make the world a better place in the short run; there are winners and losers, and it’s not clear that the gains to the winners outweigh the losses to the losers (particularly if we attach ethical weight to a more-equal distribution of income). Only if you introduce the assumption that the winners can compensate the losers does this conclusion start to make sense.

There’s nothing wrong with assumptions; as the great John Tukey said, “Without assumptions there can be no conclusions.” If you’re going to argue that mathematics or science or economics has a poor track record in decision-making, the natural reply is, “Compared to what?” Compared to your gut, it’s not at all obvious that economics has done poorly.

Where the discipline does sin, according to Rodrik, is in telling a different story to the outside world than it does to its students. Graduate economics seminars, says Rodrik, very carefully tease out all the assumptions that make the conclusions true; what shows up in the newspapers does not (“free trade good; free markets good; industrial planning bad”).

Naturally, though, if you’re going to use economics for real-world decision-making, you need some way of testing which assumptions apply in a particular case. You need data. But doubly-blinded controlled experiments in economics are few and far between, if not outright impossible. So the discipline will always suffer from an abundance of models and a dearth of practical advice on how to use them.

Here I’m reminded of the very excellent “Deconstructing the argument for free trade”, particularly this bit:

President Truman [allegedly] got so tired of hearing economists tell him “on the one hand…” that he wished for a one-armed economist. But frequently the best advice we can give is a menu of effects that flow from different choices. Trying to come up with a valid measure of the net effects is above our pay grade.

It’s a plea that economists show some humility. But since that seems to be in short supply, perhaps we need a belt-and-suspenders approach: the public, and policymakers, need to understand the limits of the discipline that they rely on.

(Rodrik link at the top via Cosma Shalizi’s Pinboard.)

Someone drove the trains to Auschwitz — January 29, 2014

Someone drove the trains to Auschwitz

Simply beautiful and haunting post by Corey Robin. It goes beyond the mere observation that “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.” It’s much more disturbing than that. The architecture of oppression depends upon many thousands of people doing their jobs *in the service of* that oppression.

To the question in there — would we fight like Pete Seeger if placed in a similar situation — the answer is probably no. I’m not answering for you; I’m answering only for myself. I’ve asked this question of myself a lot. Would I be the sort who sat at lunch counters with my black friends, drawing the jeers of segregationists? Unlikely. Threatened with the loss of my career, would I do as Seeger did and refuse to turn in my friends? I hope so, but it’s hard to map myself back into that era as anything outside the median.

And map it forward to today. What are the great issues of the day that I’m not only passively assenting to (e.g., the NSA wiretapping) but actively supporting? As I get more deeply into the trappings of bourgeois life — the wife, the kids, the home, the college educations to save for — what are the odds that I’ll resist? They seem to get slimmer by the year.

No hopeful moral here.

Two notes on a story from The Incidental Economist — January 28, 2014

Two notes on a story from The Incidental Economist

1. I’m learning that everything Bill Gardner writes is worth reading, and comes from a place of urgent humanity. Today’s story is no exception.
2. I’ve also learned recently that if you try to interact with the medical system without a doctor on your side — and maybe even then — you’re screwed. I’ve actually learned this in many contexts over the years (particularly the context of childbirth), but I’ve lately been re-learning it — either from my own experience or that of others — weekly as of late.

New York Review of Books bleg slash German Empire mini-obsession — January 27, 2014

New York Review of Books bleg slash German Empire mini-obsession

It occurred to me today that being the banker to a world-historical figure is a pretty big deal on its own. I’ll be lucky if anyone’s writing about me more than a century from now; Gerson Bleichröder (later von Bleichröder) has that honor, as a man who financed Otto von Bismarck’s rise to power. I’m now interested in reading more about Bleichröder, including a book that Pflanze cited heavily, namely Gold and Iron.

Now then. I see that there’s a review of Gold and Iron from 1977. It’s on the [mag: New York Review of Books], to whose website I don’t have access. Do any of y’all?

Richard F. Hamilton, The Social Misconstruction of Reality: Validity and Verification in the Scholarly Community — January 25, 2014

Richard F. Hamilton, The Social Misconstruction of Reality: Validity and Verification in the Scholarly Community

light purple background, yellow square in the middle, title running over the square
The basic question in here is how it happens that false ideas continue to be believed for many years after they’ve been comprehensively refuted. This is a terrifically interesting question, of course. Hamilton goes about answering it with a few scholarly examples:

  1. The Weber thesis that the capitalist spirit is inseparable from Calvinism.
  2. The idea that the Nazi party’s support in 1930s Germany came from the lower middle class.
  3. Michel Foucault’s thesis in Discipline and Punish, that the Western world had replaced punishment of the body (torture, drawing and quartering) with comprehensive control of the mind. Foucault claimed that the design of this mind control originated with Jeremy Bentham’s vision of a prison from which prisoners could be watched at all times.

Hamilton’s interest is mainly in the reasons why false ideas persist, but the book is rather overloaded with detail from each specific example. It turns out, for instance, that Weber’s work contains a basic numerical error (the sum of the entries in a particular table row not equaling 100%, as it should have) that propagated through multiple editions and was quoted in multiple other works. It also contains a lot of hasty generalization, such as assuming that Benjamin Franklin speaks for all Puritans and their descendants. It’s kind of a silly book, so why do people continue to cite its conclusions?

Oddly enough, Hamilton only addresses this question at the beginning and end of the work; the middle is a very deep dive on the data from each case, demonstrating that Weber was wrong (or at least that his argument remains unproven), and that Hitler’s support only appears to have come from the lower middle class if you ignore the effect of religion (Catholics voted against Hitler, Protestants for).

These middle bits are interesting, but, if I’m envisioning most readers correctly, you came to this work for the conclusions about why false ideas persist generally. You’re looking for a “theory of idea contamination,” perhaps. And the deep dive on the data doesn’t necessarily help with this broader theorizing. Bad ideas persist because, for instance, their inventor is too prestigious to contradict. Even physics has suffered this problem, as Richard Feynman explained:

We have learned a lot from experience about how to handle some of the ways we fool ourselves. One example: Millikan measured the charge on an electron by an experiment with falling oil drops, and got an answer which we now know not to be quite right. It’s a little bit off because he had the incorrect value for the viscosity of air. It’s interesting to look at the history of measurements of the charge of an electron, after Millikan. If you plot them as a function of time, you find that one is a little bit bigger than Millikan’s, and the next one’s a little bit bigger than that, and the next one’s a little bit bigger than that, until finally they settle down to a number which is higher.

Why didn’t they discover the new number was higher right away? It’s a thing that scientists are ashamed of–this history–because it’s apparent that people did things like this: When they got a number that was too high above Millikan’s, they thought something must be wrong–and they would look for and find a reason why something might be wrong. When they got a number close to Millikan’s value they didn’t look so hard. And so they eliminated the numbers that were too far off, and did other things like that. We’ve learned those tricks nowadays, and now we don’t have that kind of a disease.

But this long history of learning how to not fool ourselves–of having utter scientific integrity–is, I’m sorry to say, something that we haven’t specifically included in any particular course that I know of. We just hope you’ve caught on by osmosis.

The middle parts of Hamilton’s book are valuable if you might have believed that ideas like Weber’s or Foucault’s were not subject to quantitative scrutiny. Hamilton does a fine job showing that Bentham’s prison idea never went anywhere — certainly not far enough to have become the basis for anyone’s design of a society — and more to the point that Foucault rejects ordinary standards of argument. Hamilton shows that, Foucault’s desires aside, there’s no reason to reject the usual standards of logic and evidence. It’s a model of how critique should work.

For most readers, I would suggest skipping the Weber bit (unless you’ve come to his book convinced that the Protestant ethic was somehow vital to capitalism), reading the Foucault bit for its effortless dissection of Discipline and Punish, and spending lots of time on the first and last sections; those are the analytical sections that help us understand why bad ideas persist, and how institutions can be shaped to prevent their spread.

Telling Massachusetts patients how much their health care will cost — January 23, 2014

Telling Massachusetts patients how much their health care will cost

This is fine, but … isn’t this what insurers are for? If one hospital on one side of Boston charges much less than another hospital on the other side of Boston, then shouldn’t my insurer be willing to pay me to use the cheaper hospital?

Similarly: shouldn’t my insurer be willing to fly me to another state or even another country, if the cost of airfare plus the cost of the foreign medical care is less than the cost of the local medical care? And if I refuse to fly to India for dental surgery, shouldn’t my insurer say to me, “Fine, but you need to pay us a fee for not having taken the cheapest equivalent medical care”?

I’m not saying this is necessarily desirable. But it’s puzzling that the brave new world of medical care involves my sitting on the phone for hours, rather than letting my insurer take care of it. Paging Corey Robin

Medicare releasing data —

Medicare releasing data

So this is really interesting: the more data Medicare releases on provider payments, the better. But there are real concerns about patient privacy here. I remember when I was a wee undergraduate at CMU, Professor Fienberg was working on how to release raw data from the Census Bureau without revealing personally identifiable information. You can imagine the problem like this: in towns like the one I grew up in in Vermont, revealing that “the average black person” earns a certain sum of money could well mean that you’ve just revealed John Smith’s income; there just aren’t that many black people in Vermont.

As I understood it at the time — note here that my understanding is many years out of date — the Census Bureau had a couple ways of releasing its multidimensional contingency tables. First, it would only publish data in a given cell if the number of observations in that cell was above some threshold (that is, if the cell didn’t uniquely identify John Smith). I believe they also applied some scaling factor to every cell, deliberately obfuscating it so that any summary statistics from the table would come out right, but raw data were all incorrect.

These problems get harder if you’re able to combine, say, Census Data with data that you get from credit-card companies or data from (as above) hospitals. The more data you can agglomerate, the less anonymous any one source is, no matter how hard you try. I’m sure there are lots of people, all around the country, working very hard to de-anonymize various databases for marketing and law-enforcement purposes.

Point being just that, while releasing raw Medicare data would be terrific (the AMA’s comment in that link that people wouldn’t know what to do with all that raw data, and would take it out of context, is thoroughly disingenuous), there are difficult problems to surmount first. I wish them luck. I should check to see where Professor Fienberg’s work has taken him; the last update I got was more than a decade ago.

Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism — January 18, 2014

Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

Having now finished this book, I don’t entirely get what the big deal is. The argument runs as follows:

  1. There is a certain spirit that is vital to the life of capitalist societies. It is, roughly speaking, the spirit of the (idealized) Ben Franklin: work for its own sake, working for a calling, diligently saving, etc. It’s this spirit that Weber proposes to trace to its roots. He is explicitly not trying to chase down the origins of business, of industrial production, etc; as he notes, these have all existed in other times and places.
  2. This spirit comes from Calvinism specifically, less so from Lutheranism, and still less from Catholicism. Specifically, Calvin and his heirs transmuted Catholic monastic asceticism into a “worldly asceticism”. That is, rather than prove your devotion to God through quiet scholarly contemplation while holed up in a monastery, you proved that devotion by steady work toward a calling.
  3. Whereas Catholicism enables you to sin on Monday and be forgiven for it on Sunday, thereby leaving you free to sin again the next day, Calvinism requires a life that consistently and strategically aims at the greater glory of God. A Calvinist life is more totalizing, one might say, that Catholicism. It is thereby more in line with the requirements of capitalist life, where businessmen make plans that aim at the rational maximization of profit.

I think there’s an “only if” hidden in here that Weber doesn’t argue, but which would seem vital to the whole project. If the story is simply that “Protestantism carries with it a certain rationalizing spirit, and it also happens that capitalism requires this spirit,” then that would seem to be either a) confusing correlation with causation, or b) a nice coincidence that makes a fun story, nothing more. If there’s no “only if” here — if Weber isn’t telling us that capitalism requires Protestantism of a certain sort — then the story isn’t so interesting. Yes, these two strands of Western civilization sat comfortably alongside one another, but what of it?

To argue the only-if, Weber would have to show that non-Protestant societies simply lacked a fundamental piece, and that they would always be lacking an important piece of the capitalist spirit. Because again: suppose it happens that Confucian societies either a) develop the spirit that Weber calls classically Protestant, or b) don’t develop the Protestant spirit, but go on to successfully build capitalist societies. Then what happens to Weber’s story? I submit that it becomes much less interesting; it becomes a story of two developments — Calvinism and capitalism — that happened at the same time. Which is just not all that world-historically interesting a coincidence.

I could be missing something important here, but I don’t think I am. Much of The Protestant Ethic is devoted to spinning out this historical tale, so that the story from about Luther’s time to that of Franklin comes through with no gaps. But that just doesn’t seem so interesting to me. Its lack of interest reminds me a lot of Clark’s A Farewell to Alms, which tries to argue that the Industrial Revolution began in England when it did because the English had genetically (sic) developed the bourgeois virtues (saving, breeding less) under ruthless selection pressure. Even granting this facially absurd premise, what of it? Does it mean that when Korea industrialized in the 1970s, it had also attained genetic superiority? If not, then, again, Clark is just telling us a nice story with no relevance beyond its time. That seems to be where Weber has left us.

The war on the bros —

The war on the bros

What Uwe Reinhardt said. In short: if you think that it’s an outrage that you have to pay more for your health insurance so that everyone can pay the same premium, including women and the elderly and the sick, then you should have been upset at the existing system of employer-based health insurance. Women and the old and the sick *at your company* are also paying the same premium as you, even though they likely go to the doctor more.

Reinhardt doesn’t even touch on the other obvious fact: one of these days you will be sick. One of these days you and your spouse may want to have a child. One of these days you will be old. When that happens, you’ll benefit from the same community rating that supposedly harms the “bros” today.

Did this country at some point lose the notions that we’re all in this together, that we’re sharing burdens, and that we’re all only one accident away from catastrophe? The phrase is “there but for the grace of god go I”; a just society protects everyone from unexpected, uncontrollable disaster. I hope we can relearn this.