Dan Barber, The Third Plate: Field Notes on the Future of Food — August 16, 2014

Dan Barber, The Third Plate: Field Notes on the Future of Food

Title in white, overlaid on a photo of soil and clover.

Did you read [book: The Omnivore’s Dilemma]? If not, why not? If you didn’t, go read it now. I’ll wait.

Okay, great. Now that everyone reading this post has read Pollan, I think we can all agree that the bit about Joel Salatin — the Virginia farmer whose farm is “beyond organic” — is the best. Not only is Salatin pesticide-free; his cows wander the fields eating grass and leave poop behind, which yields fertilizer for future grass; the chickens follow behind the cows and peck at their poop. Salatin has created a closed ecological loop.

One bit of trouble is that farmers only produce what the market tells them to produce. If all the market wants is chicken breast, then chicken thighs and gizzards are going to go to waste. What to do?

Dan Barber’s answer in [book: The Third Plate] is that we need to widen our lens: sustainability has to include the farmer, the cook, the eater, the land … every part of the food system. If farmers will only produce what the market wants, then we need to change the market. And Barber, as a chef, knows that his people are vital to the shape of that market. We’re all about “farm to table” now, and we’re all about organic, and much of the impetus for these changes came from restaurant food movements — the [foreign: nouvelle cuisine]s and Chez Panisses of the world. If we’re going to make the food system truly sustainable, chefs will probably be on the front lines, shaping what we eaters think the word “sustainable” means.

Barber travels around the world and meets a delightful cast of farmers who are trying to change how we think about sustainability. There’s Eduardo Sousa, who’s already famous (can’t remember where I read about him; maybe [mag: The New Yorker]?) for producing [foreign: foie gras] without force-feeding his geese ([foreign: “gavage”]). There’s the farmer who shows Barber — and for my money, this is the most fascinating and disturbing part of [book: The Third Plate] — what the roots underneath modern industrial wheat and pre-industrial wheat look like. The modern roots are much shorter than the pre-industrial ones, meaning at least a few things: the roots are giving back less to the soil, they’re protecting less against the sort of soil devastation that led to the Dust Bowl, and they’re catching less rainwater than long, deep roots would. Since they catch less rainwater, they require more irrigation.

Modern wheat is inseparable from modern bread production. Since bread is now largely made at industrial scale, it requires huge quantities of flour. Whole-wheat flour turns rancid within a matter of hours after grinding, so industrial production requires some method of getting it shelf-stable. Hence: white flour.

All of this might be, at best, the sort of liberal more-sustainable-than-thou trolling that everyone knows and loves. But that’s where Barber turns this from Pollan++ into something that we can all appreciate: cuisine produced with an eye toward overall food-system sustainability just *tastes better*. Geese produced without [foreign: gavage], who are allowed to forage for their own food, know where to look to get the nutrients they need, and those nutrients show up in what we taste. Cows allowed to wander on grassland seek out — in fact, have the anatomical equipment to seek out — very select grasses to get what they need at that exact moment. Wheat with deep roots can capture and yield up more minerals from the land. We can taste these subtleties; they taste better than fruits, vegetables, and meats that have been force-fed an industrially selected diet in order to rush them out the door as fast as possible.

One metaphor that makes this make intuitive sense to me is alcohol versus Sprite. A beautiful Scotch or bourbon tastes subtle and complex and transcendent in a way that a soft drink simply never will. In principle, industrial chemistry could build a drink that features the boundless flavor profile of a delightful spirit; but if nothing else, we can expect the constant push for higher profits to push Coca-Cola Brand Highland Scotch Whiskey ™ into something simple that’s reproducible at scale. Scotch is delicious for at least two reasons: first, that yeast produce countless chemicals that (I’m given to understand) we still haven’t entirely mapped out; and second, that there’s a patient human being tending to the process, tasting each small batch to confirm that it features all the notes expected from a good Islay malt. The patience, and the biology, just seem impossible to get at industrial scale. A world of industrial wheat is a world of Sprite rather than a world of Scotch.

Exactly because industrial wheat is built for industrial scale, it’s not clear that the world Barber envisions can supply the volume of food that our current industrial world does. There are plenty of counterarguments to this point. For one, the current system tries to shove more food into the same size mouths over time, with predictably rising obesity; a food system like Barber envisions wouldn’t require unsustainably rising output. The current system also turns a vast swath of the Gulf of Mexico into a dead zone every year as fertilizer empties out of the Mississippi River; Barber’s world wouldn’t borrow from tomorrow to pay off today. “Unsustainable” doesn’t mean anything hippie-dippie. It really means nothing more than Stein’s Law: If something can’t go on forever, it will stop. A sane food system would guarantee that our children have healthy, tasty food available to them.

Barber’s book is an attempt to understand what this means, literally from ground level. He meets the farmers, he meets the chefs, he foments arguments between them, and he eats their food. Anyone who read Michael Pollan and felt angry or inspired will need to pick up and devour [book: The Third Plate].

Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Sabbath — August 14, 2014

Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Sabbath

Seemingly a woodcut of a tree with many branches growing out of knotted ground.

There are at least two ways to read this book, one of which I can get behind and the other of which I can’t. The one I can get behind is the practical and aesthetic advice on living a modern life when the Sabbath gift is available to us. We slouch through our ordinary workaday lives, not honoring the time available to us. Then the Sabbath comes. We should honor this gift of time. We should dress with respect in its presence [1]. To ignore the Sabbath is to ignore a gift.

Up to here I’m fine. More than fine, in fact. When I have kids, I intend to honor the Sabbath with them. What can be more of a gesture of respect to them than to tell them that on this day, my attention turns away from the grubby nonsense of daily living, and I focus entirely on those I love? On this day, I welcome the gift of time. Heschel’s book is largely poetry devoted to expanding on this principle, and devoted to making the reader feel its importance in his bones. In this, [book: The Sabbath] is a most eloquent success.

But Heschel was also a rabbi, so there’s a theological basis to all of this; I cannot follow him there. Time is a gift from God, says Heschel. Here I will grant that I may just not know how to read theological texts. A few years back I read a lot of theological texts and biographies of religious figures (see the list of books I’ve read over the last few years, and scroll back to 2006 or so), and every time they unavoidably made this final jump that I just couldn’t take with them: Jesus Christ is the Son of God, say. Heschel’s jump that I can’t take is that the Bible is special. It’s not just any other book. It’s not just the scribblings of some ancient tribe. This leads Heschel into the same sort of translation-mongering that you find among Christians who believe they’ve found The One True Meaning of the Bible, or among conservative legal scholars who believe that the words of the Constitution beget One True Meaning that the Framers intended.

If you don’t buy into the idea that the Bible is in any way special, then the translation-mongering is just odd. Why fuss over whether there are connections between the Hebrew for “wedding” and the Sabbath? If the document that you’re translating isn’t all that special, then this is perhaps interesting but not in any way important; discerning what the Bible intended to teach us about the Sabbath has no more importance than discerning what my grandfather, say, had to teach us about it.

If you’re Jewish, you’ll find Heschel’s idea that Judaism is a religion that honors time as well as space (with the Sabbath being God’s greatest gift of time) interesting. If you’re not, you may find it less so. To the extent that a religion of time influences your daily life as a non-Jew, you will still get value from Heschel.

So leave many of Heschel’s reasons aside. There is enough in [book: The Sabbath] without the theology. You can believe the conclusion without believing all of the reasons. And there’s reason enough in the practical value of the Sabbath. There’s reason enough in teaching us to appreciate the gift of time we have in front of us. For myself, I find it unimportant to ask who or what gave us that gift . The gift is here, and it is ours, and it is more important than ever to honor it.

[1] – I’m reminded here of Machiavelli’s letter to Vettori:

On the coming of evening, I return to my house and enter my study; and at the door I take off the day’s clothing, covered with mud and dust, and put on garments regal and courtly; and reclothed appropriately, I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where, received by them with affection, I feed on that food which only is mine and which I was born for, where I am not ashamed to speak with them and to ask them the reason for their actions; and they in their kindness answer me; and for four hours of time I do not feel boredom, I forget every trouble, I do not dread poverty, I am not frightened by death; entirely I give myself over to them.

Heschel would say that we should behave humbly, respectfully, and with grace in the presence of the Sabbath, just as Machiavelli behaved in the presence of his ancestors.

David M. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story — August 5, 2014

David M. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story

Scene from a hospital room where many, many children are in line to be inoculated.
This book skates along many thin lines, somehow managing to stay on the right side of the boundary in every case. It could easily be hagiographic about Drs. Jonas Salk and Albert Sabin, inventors of the primary polio vaccines, but it is honest and fair about both of them: Salk’s killed-virus approach to ending polio probably was the safer one, but Sabin’s mostly won the battle over the span of forty years. Moreover, Oshinsky could easily have treated Salk and Sabin as lone pioneers, locked in a gritty man-to-man war, but he doesn’t; he’s well aware — and spends most of the book explaining — that beneath the two scientists sits a vast scientific enterprise and a vast financial apparatus that put money in the men’s hands. Cosma Shalizi remarks somewhere that every scientist is an institution in miniature, and nowhere was it truer than in the race to find a cure for polio; Salk and Sabin by no means stood alone. Behind each was a veritable public-health Manhattan Project.

There was also a lot of PR magic involved in drumming up the funding that paid for the Manhattan Projects. It certainly helped, if that’s the word, that FDR developed polio in the prime of his life; he became the public face of the disease and of the organization that he promoted to end it, namely the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, commonly known as the March of Dimes. (Did you know that that’s part of why Roosevelt is on the dime? That’s a fun trivia fact that I only just learned from Oshinsky’s book. And I’ll be honest with you: I didn’t know that was FDR on the dime until just the other day. I always thought it was Truman.) Without the funding, none of the other magic could have happened. And without convincing Americans that poliomyelitis could strike at their children at any time — that everyone was vulnerable — the funding would likely have dried up.

What I find perhaps the most fascinating about the whole anti-polio enterprise is the sheer mass of boring but utterly essential logistics that made it run. Consider the amount of labor, and the amount of crushing detail, required to conduct a massive program of inoculation for a disease that didn’t victimize all that many people: at its peak in 1952, there were 21000 paralytic cases. That’s not nothing, but even in 1952 the U.S. had well over 150 million people. So now imagine trying to figure out whether your vaccine stops the disease; you’d ideally want to give the vaccine to one group of people, not give it to another group of people, and see whether the first group gets less of the disease than the second group. But since the disease is rather rare to begin with, you’d need to vaccinate a lot of children (and monitor a lot of other unvaccinated children) to see any significant differences between the groups.

So you’re studying many hundreds of thousands of children. Now just think of the difficulties in running an experiment that large. First of all, let’s imagine that people believe your vaccine works; then you can expect doctors who know which vials contain vaccine and which don’t to reserve the vaccine-filled vials for their families; this and many other reasons dictate that doctors must not know whether they’re administering vaccine or placebo. But exactly because the drug was believed to be effective, it’s unethical to deny it to vulnerable populations. Yet rigorous science demands that the drug trial be controlled (some people get the drug; some don’t), and that it be doubly blinded (patients don’t know whether they’re getting vaccine or placebo, and doctors don’t know which they’re administering). Cutting that particular knot is at the intersection of politics, ethics, and science.

In a complicated vaccine schedule like the Salk one, which required three separate shots over a span of time, you can expect some people not to come back for their followup shots. In a pre-computer era, the record of who got which shot would go onto a piece of paper, and lots of those pieces of paper would end up in the mail to a central processing facility. Some of the pieces of paper will be lost, some of the patients will be mis-coded, etc.

These details are, indeed, all mind-numbing. So it would have been necessary to build process upon process around these forms, in the expectation that the people executing those processes would get bored and let their minds wander. Essentially, the process of testing a vaccine on millions of people would require hierarchical organization and a bureaucracy. The scientist’s work embodies a scientific community in miniature.

You can think about the experiment — with all its various protocols — like the deployment of a complicated piece of software. Eventually someone is going to find a bug in the protocols — an edge case that someone didn’t quite prepare for, where the code didn’t fail appropriately. That’s exactly what happened in the Cutter incident. Imagine being Jonas Salk, his reputation hanging on the vaccine that indelibly bears his name, during the nail-biting months after all those children were shot full of his vaccine. Any of those “protocol bugs” is yours; it has your name written on it. When children die after agonizing paralysis, their deaths are unavoidably thought to be your fault.

All of this — the logistics, the personal agony of Drs. Salk and Sabin, the lab work to produce live polio virus outside of neural tissue, the petty battles between scientific personalities, the PR, the financing — is covered in David Oshinsky’s absolutely gripping [book: Polio]. You couldn’t ask for a better work of scientific journalism, yet it has the scholarly rigor that you’d expect from a longtime history professor. It has a nearly staccato rhythm that pulls you unstoppably along. It is a great achievement.

New Rick Perlstein? Yes, please. —

New Rick Perlstein? Yes, please.

Leaving aside the substantive reason that led him to write the post, I see via Paul Krugman that Rick Perlstein has a new book called [book: The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan]. I’m a terrible human for never having written a review of Perlstein’s [book: Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America]; it’s one of the best books that I’ve read in the last few years. I’ve not read his [book: Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus], but all indications are that it’s as much of a masterpiece as [book: Nixonland].

So yes: more Perlstein in this world, please.

Morris Kline, Mathematics for the Nonmathematician — July 15, 2014

Morris Kline, Mathematics for the Nonmathematician

Black background, white text. In the background is also half of the famous anatomical drawing, I think of da Vinci's.

Highly recommended, for a wide range of audiences. This book builds up mathematics from the most basic level, namely counting. More than that, though, it presents mathematics in historical, scientific, cultural, and artistic context. It proceeds through the history of mathematics, teaching theorems from geometry, arithmetic, algebra, and probability along the way. I’ve never really liked geometry, but this book made me find it fascinating. And not just the Euclidean geometry that we learn in high school; [book: Mathematics for the Nonmathematician] spends a lot of time explaining how Renaissance painters discovered the laws of perspective and based them on a rigorous geometry that they invented (namely projective geometry). I imagine my artist friends will be able to relate to this book in a way that they’ve never related to a math text before.

Then the sections on physics are astounding, and make me want to go learn the mechanics that I never really grasped in college.

Throughout, Kline sprinkles his historical discussions and his theorems with applications from as many fields as he can find. Without sacrificing much in rigor, Kline calculates the approximate distance to the moon and the Sun, and tells us how we could estimate the distance from Venus to the Sun without having to fly to Venus and set up a telescope there. He discusses the theory of optics that might have allowed the Greeks to design their famous parabolic mirror to light invading ships on fire. The volume of examples here is truly astounding, and make the book just endlessly fun.

Kline wants you to understand why mathematics is beautiful. Why, exactly, do people spend their time on this austere, arcane science? Why did the Greeks turn it into the foundation of true knowledge? And for that matter, were the Greeks as amazing as we’ve made them out to be, inventing branches of knowledge and ways of thinking that have persisted for thousands of years? (Short answer: yes.)

The Greeks believed that mathematics taught us the truth. To skip over a lot of careful explanation, Kline traces this belief from the Greeks to its demise in the 1800s. Mathematics teaches us what follows from certain axioms, but we can choose those axioms for the sake of convenience. We can invent different geometries if they’re useful to us; for that matter we can invent entirely new ways of adding numbers together if those are useful. (Kline has a particularly charming example of how you might build a system of arithmetic around baseball batting averages.) The gap between deduction, formerly thought to be the essence of infallible truth, and induction, formerly thought to be messy and error-prone, has narrowed somewhat. The axioms have to come from somewhere, and they don’t come from God. They come from humans, who pick axioms that seem to approximate some portion of the world around them. Given the axioms, we proceed step by step to certain conclusions; but the axioms are ours to create.

This is just such a fun book. I recommend it to anyone with the vaguest interest in how mathematics intersects with our world. And I thank my friend Paul for pointing me in this book’s direction.

Zia Haider Rahman, In the Light of What We Know — July 5, 2014

Zia Haider Rahman, In the Light of What We Know

The view out an airplane window. The passenger taking the photo is sitting a few rows back from the wing on the right side of the aircraft.

Hm. People seem to love this book. I’m told (though I’ve not read it yet) that [mag: The New Yorker] gave [book: In the Light of What We Know] a review brimful of superlatives. (I guess it would be James Wood’s review, which I’ll read when I’m done here.) And there *are* a lot of good things to say about this book. You know that feeling you get when you read [book: Anna Karenina], that Tolstoy was just paying much more attention than you were when you attended the same cocktail party? And that when Tolstoy got home to set his thoughts to paper, he was able to delicately pick apart his own thoughts to explain to his own satisfaction what he had just seen? Well, imagine that Tolstoy came knocking on your door after 10 years away from you, clothes in tatters and several months’ growth of beard hanging from his face. You sit down with an audio recorder between you, press record, and just listen to Tolstoy talk for weeks and months. Oh, and by the way, your father — you, the guy with the audio recorder — happens to be a Tolstoy-level intellect, who also happens to be a theoretical physicist.

But it gets better, because the perceptiveness of a Tolstoy gets thrown at a very specific set of concerns, namely Bangladeshi and Afghan immigrants to London and to the American financial system at the height of the bubble. Again, imagine Tolstoy being transported to the United States during the Cold War. Just imagine the cultural and economic divides separating Lev Tolstoy, gentleman farmer and anarchist Christian, from the world around him. Consider how strangely Americans then would treat him. And consider what magic Tolstoy’s diaries would contain.

This, then, is at least 70% of [book: In the Light of What We Know]. Our narrator’s long-lost friend, Zafar, appears at the narrator’s door. Our narrator’s marriage is falling apart, yet the narrator’s monstrous, modern, sterile, granite-countertopped apartment offers enough space to keep him and his wife nicely separated. His career is also falling apart; he’s the scapegoat at his structured-finance firm when the subprime-mortgage market is imploding. Zafar has just returned from Afghanistan. We’re given to understand that lurking within Zafar is a capacity for shocking violence. We’re given to understand many things; this is the storyteller’s gift of laying down suspense. So the first downer to note is that Rahman never really delivers on these promises. It’s considered churlish these days, I think, to expect resolution from a modern novel, so churlish perhaps I am. Regardless, you should expect no resolution.

You also shouldn’t expect to learn much about anyone other than Zafar. It’s expected, of course, that you’d understand him; his monologue is almost the entirety of the book. You won’t understand the narrator. You won’t understand the narrator’s wife, who is to all intents and purposes a nonentity. You will not understand Emily, the woman for whom Zafar feels a tortured love. This last is the real shame of the novel; Zafar, our Tolstoy, plumbs the depths of everyone else’s psyche, but Emily remains untouched. We hardly hear a word out of her mouth, by construction: Emily sits passively mute almost from the first moment we meet her. We’re given to understand that she is cold and almost robotic in her movements through life — as though she has a checklist that only she knows; if only Zafar could get access to that checklist, perhaps he could understand her. He never will have access to that checklist, of course, so cold and unfeeling she remains. All that binds her and Zafar is, it seems, a passionate physical love. This is supposed to appease the audience, I suppose — maybe we imagine Sharon Stone from the [film: Basic Instinct] days, able to condemn men to servitude with a deliberate crossing and uncrossing of her legs. Alas, Emily is the hole in the middle of the story, and it’s a hole that Rahman pretty clearly deliberately left unfilled.

Rahman hints early on that Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem — viz., that in any formal system, there are theorems which are true but which cannot be proved — will play an important part in the book. Anyone with a bit of mathematical training will, I think, recoil at this suggestion; probably no other part of mathematics has been so much the playground of mathematically illiterate cranks than has Gödel’s Theorem. I always think of Hilary Putnam here:

> Strictly speaking, all Gödel’s theorem shows is that, in any particular consistent axiomatizable extension of certain finitely axiomatizable subtheories of Peano arithmetic, there are propositions of number theory that can neither be proved nor disproved.

Not the most earth-bending theorem, when phrased that way, is it? It’s not even clear that it applies to anything that you or I care about; a negligible fraction of what we care about in our day to day lives is part of a formal system. Will the sun rise tomorrow? That’s an empirical question whose answer may rest on subatomic physics (theories that allow us to predict when the Sun’s nuclear fuel will run out), let’s say. It’s quite clear that the answer, or its nonexistence, has nothing at all to do with whether Peano arithmetic is complete.

So it’s both a blessing and a curse that Rahman never really does anything with Gödel. It’s a blessing, because I just don’t expect novelists to treat Gödel with the care that he deserves; and it’s a curse, because Rahman clearly believes that Gödel belongs *somewhere* within his novel, and always threatens to drag him in from the margins.

The resulting novel is, frankly, kind of a muddle. If Zafar had just been the Virgil to our Dante, exploring the minds of those he passed on the streets of London, what we’d have is a deeply penetrating work of social analysis. As it is, we have some of that, plus some math, plus some purely perfunctory characters, plus an ending that’s meant to be shocking but feels, instead, like Rahman was in a hurry to wrap up.

I’d strongly recommend using a well-sharpened X-Acto knife to slice out the final 50-75 pages. Read up to there, enjoy the time you spent with Zafar, and move along.

__P.S.__: [mag: The New Yorker] writes

> For years, Zafar has been obsessed with the Austrian mathematician Kurt Gdels Incompleteness Theorem: Within any given system, there are claims which are true but which cannot be proven to be true. The elegant proof hangs over this novel like an intellectual rainbow.

No, the proof does not. And the fact that the review says this makes me wonder if its author is aware of how the proof is constructed. I doubt the reviewer believes that Gdel-numbering is somehow a leitmotif for this novel.

Shorter Great Divergence — June 13, 2014

Shorter Great Divergence

Detail of _Guangzhou Factories, 1855-1856_, Sunqua, oil on canvas.
Once in a very great while, I find something that I *swear* is an extended academic joke. I don’t mean “joke” in the sense that it’s unserious; I mean that the delivery of the whole thing is conducted with a tongue very forcefully rammed into a cheek. Maybe the best example of such a thing is Leo Harrington’s talk proposing an analogy between Hegelian logic and some topics in group theory. There’s just no way he’s serious there, but I’ll be damned if the man ever cracks a smile.

Pomeranz’s [book: The Great Divergence] is deadly serious. What could be more serious than a discussion of why the West won? The whole discussion is so often laden with moralistic Gregory Clark-style musings, and very often the whole exercise seems like an excuse to praise white people.

Which is why Pomeranz is so funny, to me at least. Throughout the book (I’m about halfway done) I hear him humming gently in the background, “It’s the slavery, stupid”. The rest of the book is very rigorous academic garb for that very simple idea.

I’m absolutely certain that I undervalue the importance of slavery to literally every bit of American history. That’s why constantly reminding myself, via something like Ta-Nehisi Coates’s reparations piece, is so vital.

The somewhat longer story, from Pomeranz, is that many nations were running up against fundamental labor and land constraints in the 1700s, and that Western Europe eliminated those constraints, respectively, by a) enslaving Africans and bringing them to the Americas, and b) taking over North America and killing all the native people there.

I really do hear Pomeranz saying throughout, in as measured a way as possible, “You are ignoring the biggest story of at least the last half-millennium if you ignore these.” That’s what I hear when he politely swats down one story, namely that white people had developed a habit of consumer acquisitiveness which started with increased consumption of sugar and tea. I hear Pomeranz quietly saying, “Interesting that you focus on the *consumers* of the sugar. Where do you think Western Europe got all that sugar?

Thus far the bulk of the argument has been to show that the data don’t show any significant differences between Chinese culture and the Western European one; and to the extent that there are any such differences, they tend to tilt in China’s favor. Pomeranz shows that the Chinese government was no more resistant to urbanization than the British one; that it wasn’t any more insistent that women stay out of the workforce; and so forth.

That’s all by way of ideological thicket-clearing. Presumably the next steps in the argument from here cut to the heart of the matter and show that only slavery and extermination of the indigenous population are of the right magnitude to explain why the West rose when it did. Pomeranz has also hinted that the Chinese government’s remonetizing silver when it did was well-timed with the Spanish government’s mining of silver in the New World; it prolonged foreign investment when that infrastructure was needed. And part of *that* story is an interesting one about how long-distance trade requires sophisticated banking: if your goods disappear long before you receive payment for them, and if that payment ultimately comes from someone thousands of miles away, you need some strong guarantees that you’ll get your money; these guarantees, in turn, probably require strong institutions that allow people to trust each other; and so on down the line. Presumably Pomeranz will show at some point that these institutions were just as strong in China (which has famously had a strong central government since well before the time of Christ) as they were in the West.

This scope of argument can often make me experience vertigo. You’re explaining the growth of an entire civilization, after all, even while you’re pulling in the very worst acts that we’ve ever perpetrated against other humans. Pomeranz doesn’t often let us get lost staring at the stars, because — bless him — he is off in the weeds. He has to be: if people are going to argue that there’s something vital in the bourgeois souls of white folk — something which allowed white people to rise to take the mantle of leadership over the benighted races — then there are probably just about two options:

1. Engage with this on its own vague level, pointing out that the Chinese *are so* good people; or
2. Try to find data that can concretely address these sorts of claims.

You probably can guess that I prefer 2. to 1., despite the paucity of the data. I’d rather believe a small number of things based on the little bits of truth that we can polish here and there, than believe a lot of transparently self-serving metaphysical bollocks about the superiority of white people. So when Pomeranz goes off in the weeds on these sorts of things, I think we’re obliged to follow him.

This is probably the third time I’ve tried to make my way through [book: The Great Divergence], though, because the weeds have — I admit — thrown me off in the past. I’m over that now; I find the book fascinating, because its eyes really are focused on the stars even while it’s digging in the dirt. If you bear that in mind while you’re reading Pomeranz, I think you’ll appreciate it as much as I now do.

Susan E. Eaton, The Other Boston Busing Story: What’s Won and Lost Across The Boundary Line — June 1, 2014

Susan E. Eaton, The Other Boston Busing Story: What’s Won and Lost Across The Boundary Line

A toy school bus on top of a map of metro Boston

This book is a couple-thousand-word-long blog post that has, through laborious and painful editing, been stuffed into a couple-hundred-page-long book.

Boston has two busing stories, one famously terrible, the other successful and not famous. The first busing story is the one covered epochally well in Lukas’s [book: Common Ground], which is one of the few books that I think every American ought to read (the others are [book: The Making of the Atomic Bomb], Caro’s [book: The Power Broker], and Cronon’s [book: Nature’s Metropolis]). It is the “forced busing” story that everyone’s heard of, which tore apart Boston in the Seventies.

The other story is METCO, a voluntary program by which the parents of poor black students from inner-city Boston can choose to send their kids to white suburban schools. By all accounts that I’ve seen, it’s been a quiet success. There are many questions you could ask about it:

* How are the outcomes? Compared to their peers, how well do METCO students do later in life? How well do white people relate to black people after they’ve shared a class with them?
* Are the parents who send their kids to METCO systematically more involved in their kids’ education than the parents who don’t, so that the kids would be more likely to succeed than their peers even if they attended inner-city schools?
* Why has the program not expanded, if it’s been so successful?
* Has METCO helped or hindered the goal of merging urban and suburban school districts? Was that ever an option?

Eaton’s focus is not on any of these. Instead she repeats the same few points over and over:

* Black students often felt like they had lost their identities to METCO, with their friends back home thinking them too white for the neighborhood and their white schoolmates treating them as gangland curiosities (“Do you own a gun? How often do you see people being shot?”)
* Later in life, METCO students often found themselves able to walk the line between black and white people in the workplace; they were ambassadors, in a way that their colleagues who’d grown up with a segregated education were not.
* For all its difficulties, most METCO adults would go through the experience again, and most would put their kids through METCO. The few who really hated METCO did so because they felt it had destroyed their identity and left them rootless, or because white people just couldn’t get over their classmates’ blackness.

These are fine, interesting points. I would have liked them much more had they been in the hands of a different author. Or indeed, I would have liked them more had the author just stepped out of the way and added no narration to the lengthy interviews she’d conducted with 65 METCO adults. The interviewees were interesting enough on their own. Also, this just didn’t need to be a book; an academic paper would have been plenty.

Most of us, though, are primarily going to want to know other things about METCO, like how it functions as a program *as well as* how it changes the racial identities of its participants. That is indeed why I found this book to begin with: it was cited in Gerald Grant’s book, as though Eaton’s book had something to say about METCO as a whole. Sadly for me, it doesn’t. Perhaps your interest is much more about racial identity than mine was; if so, Eaton’s book may be for you.

I just saw amazing theater — May 28, 2014

I just saw amazing theater

The Tempest at the American Repertory Theater. Music by Tom Waits. Dance by Pilobolus. Magic by Teller of Penn and Teller. It’s all so elegantly and fluidly combined that it seems perfectly natural for all of these things to exist cheek by jowl. Ariel lazily makes card decks disappear. A Greek chorus performing Waits’s “Dirt in the Ground” couldn’t be more natural. Caliban is performed here by two dancers practically lashed to one another, twirling across the stage and always just a few degrees from the vertical; indeed, they’re always unstably in motion. Prospero, by contrast, is all economy of motion, upright and stern throughout. I couldn’t breathe whenever he uttered a word.

The play was by turns funny and unspeakably moving, jaw-dropping and toe-tapping. Waits’s music and Teller’s magic couldn’t be a better fit for The Tempest‘s playful, mythological island fantasy.

If you’re in the Boston area, you need to find some way to get into The Tempest during its run. If there’s any justice in the world, it’ll soon move to Broadway, and you’ll be able to catch it there.

Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy — May 25, 2014

Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy

A bunch of maps of the world in blue up at the top of the page, with latitude and longitude lines clearly marked off; then in the middle of the page, the title of the book; then at the bottom of the page, the world having apparently been run through the meat grinder of capitalism, of socialism, and of democracy, we have a bunch of fractured worlds ... for some reason that I can't really discern.
I have this hypothesis about works labeled ‘classics’; the hypothesis is that the only parts of ‘classic’ works that anyone bothers to quote are those from the beginning of the works, and that the reason for this is that that’s as far as most people read.

So it is with Schumpeter. All anyone ever quotes is the thing about ‘creative destruction’, which is indeed important, but which Schumpeter is done discussing by 1/3 of the way through [book: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy]. So because I am expected to talk about creative destruction, even though it is not actually all that important to the book, I am now going to talk about creative destruction.

The real risk to corporations in a dynamic capitalist economy, says Schumpeter, is not that someone will come along and make the same product as they do, only cheaper. The real risk is that someone will come along and invent something that makes their entire business model irrelevant. Think the Internet displacing newspapers; think, indeed, of people who spent their entire lives training to work at printing presses and now find themselves in their fifties without skills that anyone is willing to pay for. Or think of record stores in the face of MP3s. Or think of train conductors in the era of the personal motorcar. Or think of secretaries in the era of Microsoft Word.

So that’s the bit about creative destruction that everyone bothers to discuss. Where they don’t go from there is where Schumpeter goes, namely to pointing out that in a world that is being creatively destroyed, much of economics is studying the wrong things and understanding the world in the wrong way. We need to stop thinking about a static world, where we have a static problem in front of us and entrepreneurs are expected to solve that static problem with a static solution. For instance, the problem isn’t just “how do I maximize my profit on widgets, given this set of competitors before me who are all trying to make the same widget, only cheaper?” The problem is “how do I fight off this set of competitors, and prepare for the possibility that my entire industry will be wiped out in 10 years?” As Schumpeter notes, this new framing makes “monopoly” look a lot less menacing than a static analysis alone would imply: the monopolist may just be saving money in preparation for being creatively destroyed.

Or the monopolist may not! It may just be good old-fashioned evil monopoly. But the point is that our entire mode of analysis has to get out of a static frame into a dynamic one, and that the dynamic frame is a lot more complicated than the static one.

Maybe 20 pages after the discussion of creative destruction, Schumpeter notes that capitalism won’t survive. And he spends the remainder of the book defending that point. The reader might spend a moment pondering why the latter argument gets less play from the likes of Thomas Friedman than do the creative-destruction parts.

Schumpeter’s reasons for believing that capitalism won’t survive look fairly questionable these days. First, he says that bourgeois rationality — the habit of rationally calculating costs and benefits for everything, in all spheres of life — inevitably removes the heroic, innovative potential from capitalism. Bourgeois capitalism inevitably leads to big business (here Schumpeter and Marx would agree), and big business trains us all to effectively be good little managers, counting our dollars and cents. This eventually works its way into our personal lives: in 1942, Schumpeter expected that fewer people would choose to have kids as their bourgeois worlds narrowed, and as child-rearing thereby became yet another institution subject to cost-benefit analysis. The scope for heroic capitalism would fade away under capitalism’s own tendencies. Not only that, but the decrease in the number of children would lead people to plan less for the future, which again would weaken one of capitalism’s motive pillars.

The outcome — capitalism destroying itself from within — agrees with Marx, to the extent that I understand Marx, but the mechanism is a little different: while Marx believed that increasing scale would lead to bigger and bigger business, with workers being repeatedly thrown out of work as machines replaced them, Schumpeter argues that capitalism as a cultural force would undermine the very creative-destructive underpinnings of capitalism. The system’s internal contradictions, in both cases, would cause it to burn out, but in the Schumpeterian world there is no reserve army of the unemployed to rise up and expropriate the expropriators; there’s just a slow exhaustion from within.

Secondly, there’s the New Deal. Schumpeter is annoyingly loath to criticize specific policies or specific people for at least the first 2/3 of [book: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy], but it’s fairly clear even before he turns explicit that he’s annoyed with Depression-era economic policies. Again, Schumpeter believes that the New Deal and friends are the self-contradictions of capitalism weakening it from within. Capitalism, he says, creates a class of out-of-work intellectuals who profit on critiquing the capitalist order. When I read this, I confess to you that I raised my left eyebrow in an “oh, come on” sort of way: this does seem to massively overstate the importance of intellectuals. In any case, if you hand-wave over the middle part of the argument, it goes like this: capitalism creates this critical caste of workers, who then somehow work their ideas into the corridors of power, thereby creating the New Deal and friends, thereby sapping capitalism of its vital powers, thereby (again) weakening it and eventually ending it.

This all seems awfully wrong in retrospect. I’d like to have the historical imagination to put myself back in Schumpeter’s shoes. Whatever the context around his thoughts was, he seems like very much an iconoclast. He was pretty clearly anti-Keynesian, anti-New Deal, and so forth. And he was maybe socialist, but maybe not; he’s reluctant throughout the book to tell us what he really feels, instead suggesting that all he’s doing is mapping out the world that would result if present trends stayed the course. He might well be a socialist, but if nothing else he understands his Marx. And he certainly understands why people are socialist; in this, you might say that he echoes Corey Robin: socialists aim to convert hysterical misery into ordinary unhappiness.

I would have liked Schumpeter to have expanded upon the analysis of capitalism’s social effects. In the full scope of his argument, the social analysis is mostly there as a building block toward the larger analysis of capitalism’s future. He’s less concerned about the effects that capitalism has, for instance, on the family as an institution. The family itself is just a building block toward the larger structure. This is unfortunate, because his analysis of capitalism’s social effects seems far and away the most prescient.

There’s much else that I can’t get into here, including a fine synopsis of Marxist thought and an analysis of what democracy actually is. Actually, maybe I’ll spend a moment on the latter. Schumpeter wants to know what democracy really is. In some vague sense, we would probably all say that it’s a system under which “the people [in some sense] rule [in some sense]”. Schumpeter picks this apart. What do we mean by “the people”? We can’t mean that democracy is a system under which every citizen has the right to vote: the modern U.S. won’t allow those under 18 to vote, and we’re clearly a democracy; the U.S. didn’t allow women to vote until the 20th century, and we were clearly a democracy then, too; Germany was a democracy in some sense when Hitler rose to power; etc. After quite a bit of arguing along similar lines, Schumpeter defines democracy as a system in which leaders compete in the market for power. … Here I’ve only sketched a few pages of argument, which Schumpeter then uses as the groundwork for still more analysis of whether socialism or democracy ought to give way when they come in conflict.

It’s intensely thoughtful and intricate, and I’ve not even unpacked half of it yet. The only critique I’d make is that the writing style seems to come from someone who spoke German natively; I lost the thread of many sentences by the time I reached the end. But it’s worth it, because Schumpeter is unorthodox and brilliant. Well worth your time and thought.